ஒரு பத்திரம்

ஒக்ரோபர் 15, 2006

TAMIL EELAM: RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, President of Tamil United Front 1974

கோப்பு வகை: Uncategorized — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

Memorandum from Tamil United Front
to 20th Conference of Commonwealth Parliamentarians

Sri Lanka – 1 September 1974

Greetings to all delegates in the name of the Tamils of Ceylon.
We extend to you a very warm welcome.

This memorandum is presented to you in the hope that through you, world conscience will be awakened to the present plight of the Tamils in this country, who are being systematically subjected to a denial of human rights, various forms of racial discrimination and other practices which could lead to the genocide of the Tamils.

The Tamils of Ceylon constitute a separate nation divided from the Sinhalese nation by territory, language, religion and culture.

At the beginning of European conquest, there were THREE SEPARATE KINGDOMS in Ceylon: A Tamil kingdom in the North and two Sinhalese kingdoms in the South. The Tamil kingdom fell to the Portuguese in 1619. The Dutch replaced the Portuguese in 1659, who in turn capitulated to the British in 1796. The British also took over the Kandyan Sinhalese kingdom in 1815, thus gaining mastery over the three kingdoms covering the entire island.

These territories which were isolated from each other and administered as separate areas were brought together into one administrative unit by the British in 1833. This was done for reasons of administrative convenience without consent of the peoples of the island. In fact the Kandyan Sinhalese protested against this unification.

The British thus imposed a common administrative system on the whole island with English as the Language of the government. In this way they brought together two peoples who had lived separately through the ages. When it became clear that the British were ready to share some of their authority with the local leaders, the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese came to the surface. In 1945 when the time came for the transfer of power to the peoples of this country, the Board of ministers submitted their own proposals for a new constitution. The Tamils almost in one voice rejected their proposals in-as-much as they were calculated to place the minorities of Ceylon in a position of subordination to and dependence on the racial majority.

A Royal Commission under the Chairmanship of Lord Soulbury was sent to Ceylon in order to examine and discuss any proposal for constitutional reform in the island. Recognizing the general state of apprehension and suspicion in the minds of minority communities when power was to be transferred from neutral British hands to the people of a country, the commission became alert to the need for minority safeguards.

The Commissioners therefore accepted the assurance of the Board of Ministers in the belief that the latter were fully aware that the contentment of the minorities is essential, not only to their well-being but to the well being of the Island as a whole.

Moreover the British Government issued a White Paper on the basis of the Commissions report and made it clear to the Board of Ministers of Ceylon, that any legislative action by the British would be conditional on the acceptance of their proposal by the minorities. This acceptance was secured by many promises and assurances by the Sinhalese leaders, the hollowness of which have been manifest by the actions of successive Governments. It is significant that Lord Soulbury himself was later disillusioned by the disregard of these assurances by the Sinhalese leaders. Lord Soulbury has in his forward to the book, Ceylon a Divided Nation by Professor B. H. Farmer said:

“The Commission had of course a cursory knowledge of the age long antagonism between these two communities but might have been less hopeful of a solution had Mr. Farmers book been available to underline the deplorable effect of centuries of troubled history upon the Ceylonese today… Needless to say the consequences have been a bitter disappointment to myself and my fellow Commissioners…”

The Tamils however hoped that the administrative unity established by the British Government could be preserved and towards that end made three significant suggestions.

(a) Balanced Representation:
Our earliest request was for balanced representation in the legislature as advocated by the Duke of Devonshire, who was Secretary of State for Colonies. It was based on a balanced scheme of representation that would avoid the danger of concentration of power in one community but would ensure its equitable distribution among all communities and the people as a whole. But the Soulbury Commissioners did not grant this.

(b) The demand for a Federal Constitution:
Secondly, within a year of independence, when the position of the Tamils was fast deteriorating, the demand for a federal form of government was put forward. It was felt that this was the only way of keeping together two distinct nations in one state. It may be remembered here that Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranayake strongly advocated federalism as far back as May 1926 or even earlier, but would not concede when he came to power. The following excerpts are taken from his speech of his in the Ceylon Morning Leader July 17th.

“If they considered past history then they would see that the three communities, the Tamils, the Low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese had lived for over a thousand years in Ceylon and had not shown any tendency to merge… A central form of Government assumed a homogenous whole…”

But when the objections were dissipated he was convinced that some form of FEDERAL GOVERNMENT would be the ONLY SOLUTION.”

The New Constitution of 1972 and the six-point formula.
Thirdly, these suggestions were finally rejected and a new constitution was unilaterally imposed in 1972. This Constitution took away even the meager safeguards provided in the Soulbury Constitution and in addition imposed further disabilities on the non-Sinhalese, non-Buddhist population. This brought the Tamils together under the banner of the Tamil United Front (TUF). comprising all Tamil political parties, major trade unions and prominent non-party Tamils. The TUF is today recognized as the voice of the Tamil people.

The TUF rejected the Constitution and put forward a six-point formula as the minimum prerequisite for keeping the two nations together., while preserving the territorial, linguistic, religious and cultural integrity of the Tamils. The Tamil United Front demands that the Constitution should be amended so as to secure the aspirations of the Tamil people in respect of the following:

(a) The Tamil Language should be given the same status in the Constitution as the Sinhala Language.

(b) There should be constitutional guarantee of full citizenship rights to all Tamil-speaking people who have made this country their home. There should be no different categories of citizens and no discrimination between them, and also no power to the state to deprive citizen of his citizenship.

(c) The state shall be secular, while equal protection is afforded to all religions.

(d) The Constitution should provide for valid fundamental rights guaranteeing the equality of all persons on ethnocultural grounds.

(e) The Constitution shall provide for the abolition of caste and untouchabilitty.

(f) In a democratic and socialist society, a decentralized structure of government alone will make it possible for a participatory democracy where power will be peoples power rather than state power.

The reasonableness of the demand put forward by the TUF is amply demonstrated by the fact that every single political party with the Sinhalese leadership had accepted the demands in some form or other both before and after independence, but this Government has not even cared to consider these proposals.

The Tamils have traversed a long road and are now at the end of their tether. When two nations cannot get on together they come to the parting of ways. Has the parting come? That is the problem of the Tamils of Ceylon.

UNDER NEO-COLONIALISM.
The Sinhalese leaders have one objective, of converting the bi-national, bi-lingual, multi-religious state of Ceylon into a uni-national state with one nation – the Sinhalese, a uni-lingual state with the Sinhala only and with one religion – Buddhism, involving genocide against the Tamils. This is substantiated by the following statement to the Press by a Cabinet Minister of the present Government and reported in the Ceylon Daily News of 27 th August 1974:

“In fact one of the things happening now is that, many Indian Tamils who were earlier isolated are now learning Sinhala and even adopting our names and religion This is part of the social assimilation.”

For the sake of brevity we give, in some detail just six areas where there is pursuance of the above policy, and list the others;

1. CITIZENSHIP AND DISFRANCHISEMENT.
Within a few months of gaining independence, it was not difficult for the Sinhalese leaders to forget all the promises and assurances they had given to the Tamils, and by the Citizenship Act. No. 19 of 1948 to make a million Tamils stateless, who prior to Independence enjoyed the same rights as other Ceylonese.

This act affected adversely the totality of Tamils and even Muslims. Those who had Tamil or Muslim names had to submit proof of Citizenship in regard to many matters connected with the Government. The following are some of them:

(a) Employment in public sector.
(b) The issue of Passport or other travel documents.
(c) The issue of certificates of citizenship.
(d) The issue of Rice Ration books.
(e) Inclusion of names in the Electoral Registers.
(f) The registration of transfers of property or shares.
(g) The registration of a person as a Ceylonese Trader.
(h) Other spheres reserved partly or fully for Ceylonese.

In the following year the Ceylon (Parliamentary) Elections Amendment Act. No. 48 of 1949 was passed which again deprived the same group of Tamils of the right to vote. At no time did the Board of Ministers (all Sinhalese) of the State Council of Ceylon, who negotiated the Independence with British

Government ever give even an inkling of their intention to deprive half the Tamil population of Ceylon of their Franchise rights. On the other hand, in the memorandum they submitted to Whitehall on constitutional reforms they devised a scheme of representation under which they expected the Sinhalese to have 58 seats, Ceylon Tamils 15 seats, Indian Tamils 14 seats.

The deteriorating position can be seen in the following table:

COMMUNITY 1947 1952 1956 1960 1960
% of seats % of seats % of seats % of seats % of seats
Sinhalese 63 73 73 78 77
Ceylon Tamils 13 12 12 11 11
Indian Tamils 7 Nil Nil Nil Nil
Muslims 6 8 7 6 7

The above figures will show that a constitution devised and fashioned to give weightage in representation to minorities was in fact perverted to give weightage to the majority-

2. INROADS INTO TAMIL TERRITORY

The Government implemented schemes of State-aided colonization of traditional Tamils areas by colonizing Sinhalese and thereby increased the Sinhalese voting strength in the legislature. Within the first few years of Independence, colonization of the Eastern Province, a Tamil area, by the Sinhalese had proceeded at such rapid rate that before the end of the 1950s there were enough Sinhalese to return a Sinhalese member to Parliament. Apart from such colonization, special licenses were given to Sinhalese to obtain lands in Tamil areas in preference to the Tamils of the area. illegal squatting on Crown land by Sinhalese was encouraged and regularized while Tamils were punished and driven away. All this was not a natural movement of population but a Government directed plan.

3. LANGUAGE.
It is in regard to the right to use their language on the basis of equality with their fellow citizens that the Tamils have experienced the greatest humiliation and disappointment. Up to 1955 there was never a doubt that Sinhala and Tamil would be on equal footing and enjoy equality of status. Indeed in the State Council a resolution to the effect that Sinhala and Tamil would be the official languages was accepted by a large majority.

Speaking on the occasion the late Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranayake said:

“But generally speaking there is no question that one of the most important ingredients of nationality is Language, because it is through the vehicle of language that the aspirations, the yearnings and triumphs of a people through the centuries are enshrined and preserved. Therefore all that it means to a nation from the psychological, from the sentimental, from the cultural points of view, the value of nationality from all those points of view are expressed through the medium of language. That is why language is such an important ingredient of nationality…

What then is the object of having Sinhalese alone as the official language? If the objection is that it is rather awkward to have more than one official language, I should like to point out that other countries are putting up with more than two official languages and are carrying on reasonably satisfactorily…

I do not see that there would be any harm at all in recognizing the Tamil language also as an official language. It is necessary to bring about that amity, that confidence among the various communities which we are all striving to achieve within reasonable limits. Therefore, on the second point, I have no personal objection to both these languages being considered official languages; nor do I see any particular harm or danger or difficulty arising from it.(Official Report State Council, 25h May 1944: Vol. I c809)

The Official Language Act No. 33 Of 1956, however, provided that Sinhala shall be the one Official Language in Ceylon. The Tamils considered this act a great betrayal and have not ceased to agitate for equality of status for the Tamil Language.

In 1961 for 57 days the Tamil speaking people performed Satyagraha outside of the Chief Government Offices in the Principal cities of the Tamil territory — Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Mannar, Jaffna — thus bringing the administration in these areas to a stand-still.

The Government imposed a state of emergency and used the Armed Forces to unleash a reign of terror in these areas. The Tamil M.P.s and leading Tamils like Kanthiah Vaithianathan were placed under detention. When some legislative provision has been made for the use of the Tamil language in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, Sinhala continued to be largely used as the sole language of public business causing inconvenience, embarrassment, and humiliation to the Tamils.

4. EDUCATION.
We list herein specific areas in education where there is severe discrimination:

(a) Education amending Acts Nos. 5 of 1960 and 8 of 1961 took over Schools run by Tamils and Christian denominations but Buddhist Privena Schools were allowed to continue as voluntary schools with state aid.

(b) Estate schools for children of Tamil plantation workers were not taken over and continue to remain the extremely poor standard in which they have been all the time.

(c) Tamil medium schools in Tamil areas were converted into Sinhala medium schools, thus forcing them to study in Sinhala medium.

(d) After the take-over of the schools, some schools in South Ceylon where there were predominantly Tamil children were converted to Sinhala schools without alternate provisions for the Tamil children.

(e) The medium of instruction in four schools in the North was changed from Tamil to Sinhala.

(f) Access to Higher Education.- Since the present Government came into power there has been racial discrimination. In 1970 admissions, a higher standard was required of Tamil Students. Merit was abandoned. and under cover of giving weightage to students in rural areas, the Government instituted a racial system of admission. We give below the minimum aggregate marks required of Tamil and Sinhalese students in 1970.

Aggregate marks required for admission to the University from:

Tamils Sinhalese
Peradeniya- Engineering 250 225
Katubedde- Engineering 232 212
Medicine and Dentistry 250 229
Agriculture, Veterinary & Bio-Science 184 174
Physical Science 204 183
Architecture 194 180

Since then Government has conceded that this was a mistake, but it continues with the same objective through a secret scheme of standardization based on language media and area quotas: the consequential effect is to whittle down the admission of Tamil students wbo on the ground of merit alone would be eligible for higher education.

5. VIOLENCE AGAINST TAMILS.
The Tamils have been subjected to violence in 1956, 1957, 1959, 1961 and 1974. In 1958 Tamils outside the Tamil territory were set upon by organized groups of Sinhalese and were subjected to murder, torture, rape and looting. In 1961 it was used to disperse the Satyagrahis; in 1974 violence was used to disperse large crowd listening to a non-political cultural address where nine persons were killed. The Police and Army often ran berserk and spread violence and terror over a much larger area than the prescribed scene.

6 STARVATION AND DEATH.
The plantation industry of tea, rubber and coconut constitutes the backbone of the economy of this country. It is a tragedy of the worst magnitude that the very Tamil workers on the plantations whose labor provides the life blood for the economic life of this country have been made political, social, and economic outcasts by the operation of national laws, since this country attained independence. The extent of the problem faced by over a million Tamil people concentrated on the plantations has assumed the character of genocide by reason of starvation due to unemployment, low wages, and drastic cuts imposed on the quantities of food items made available to them. The cumulative effect of all this is a sharp increase in their death rate and plantation workers and their families have been forced to move into towns to beg for food.

We conclude by merely listing the other means whereby the Tamils are put to grave hardships:

1 . Denial of equal opportunities of employment to Tamils in Government Service and Government controlled corporations.
2. Sustained propaganda against Tamils through Government approved school textbooks.
3. Continued Police and Army action in Tamil areas.
4. Denial of the right of peaceful assembly.
5. Denial to many Tamils and Tamil leaders the right to leave the country.
6. Absence of effective provisions in the Constitution protecting the Fundamental Rights of minorities.
7. Arbitrary arrests and detentions (at the moment there are 42 Tamils under such detention) and
8. cruel and inhuman treatment at the time of arrest and during detention.
9. The grant of :the foremost place to Buddhism and imposing on the State a constitutional duty to protect and foster that religion.
10. Denial of the right of representation to 50,000 in the Kankesauthurai Electorate by maliciously refusing to hold the by-election for the last two years.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND TAMILS.
Sri Lanka is today a State with two nations and the Tamil nation there in seeks its inalienable right of self-determination. The Tamil problem is not an internal affair. Shri Rajagopalachari, the First Governor General Of India has stated:

“Most private wrongs are done within family walls, and most public wrongs within the borders of States. If world opinion is to consider state frontiers sacrosanct then there will be no chance for world progress as a whole; tyranny would have received a world charter.”

Any attempt therefore, to regard the Tamil question as an internal affair of the State of Sri Lanka, would amount to an evasion of recognizing the political and social realities in the country. There is little doubt that the situation, fraught with many dangers, is gradually getting out of hand and is one for which there are unfortunately many parallels. From all accounts the Tamils of Ceylon are beginning to despair of obtaining their right, through discussion, compromise, and peaceful means; tensions and frustrations are beginning to crystallize around issues which sooner or later am likely to lead to a point of no return.

In Ceylon today there is closely a situation where immediate action and assistance are necessary to stop a bad situation from getting worse. The question would arise whether the subject of minority nationalities in Commonwealth countries could be discussed even if such a subject is not on the agenda of the conference. There have been occasions in the past when the conference did consider subjects like Kashmir and Apartheid even though they were not on the agenda. The rapidly deteriorating situation here, demands in the name of common humanity that the Tamil question of Ceylon be considered at the 20th conference. Recent history shows that the nations of the world have moved to help a smaller nation in distress, only after many paid with their lives for their legitimate rights.

The CPA is an Association of Commonwealth parliamentarians who, irrespective of race, religion or culture are united by community of interest, respect for the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of the individual citizens and by pursuit of the positive ideals of parliamentary democracy.

THEREFORE, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE TAMILS IN CEYLON WILL RECEIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION OF THE DELEGATES ASSEMBLED AT THIS CONFERENCE AND THAT THEY WILL USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES TO HELP IN THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C.,
President, Tamil United Front,
16, Alfred House Gardens
Colombo 3,
Sri Lanka.

Source:

TAMIL EELAM: RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION

ஒக்ரோபர் 14, 2006

De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

கோப்பு வகை: LTTE,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam,War of Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

Security Forces Commander, Jaffna peninsula, Major General Sarath Fonseka, outlined a plan to enable the resettlement of civilians (internally displaced persons) in High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna peninsula. He tabled these proposals in a letter sent to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on December 20, 2002. Primarily, he had called for disarming the LTTE to enable such re-settlement, and for maintaining a ‘balance of forces’ between the LTTE and government forces.

Presented below is the complete text of the proposals.

DE-ESCALATION PLAN

PREAMBLE

  1. GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and security forces appreciate the most important humanitarian need to resettle people back in the houses in areas affected by the war. In this sense expansion of HSZ [High Security Zone] from time to time has caused displacement of people in the Jaffna peninsula thus creating & humanitarian problem. Therefore GOSL and Security Forces has realized the need to expedite the resettling of displaced people and are keen to find a workable solution to solve this issue.
  2. It is also understood resettling civilians in HSZ can bring about a big political success to the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and any other interested parties. Therefore it can have a direct impact on political situation in Jaffna which may be most probably go in favour of LTTE under present political situation. While appreciating this situation it should also be born in mind that when talking in term of political situation, political criticism in the south of Sri Lanka also cannot be ignored. Therefore any adjustment or variations in Security Zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical.
  3. While appreciating the humanitarian achievements, consequences which will affect the Sri Lankan security forces and military gains the LTTE will achieve due to resettling civilian in HSZ should be also taken in to consideration. Therefore resettling civilians in the HSZ should go hand in glove with a de-escalation process agreed by both GOSL and LTTE. While appreciating the urgent need to resettle people in HSZ it is imperative that political mileage which the GOSL has to maintain through out the peace process should not be hindered by creating a weak security environment in the North.
  4. NEED FOR SECURITY

  5. As existence and strength of HSZ is utmost vital for success of defences’ and security of Jaffna peninsula and islands, no risks or chances should be taken, to weaken security by making HSZ vulnerable.
  6. As the present dimensions of HSZ are meant to face the present threat weakening HSZs should be done in relation to reduction of LTTE military options ranging from major conventional attacks to asymmetric attacks.
  7. Any normalizing plan which affects the sy [system] of HSZ should go hand in glove with reducing military options available to LTTE.
  8. Armed groups having the ability to get cover behind civilians should not be ignored and leave terrorist to take maximum advantage.
  9. Armed groups if mixed up with civilians to enter HSZ or get Int about HSZ will find it easier to launch physical attacks rather than firing long range wpns as presence of civilians in HSZ may hinder the freedom to fire long range wpns [weapons].

  10. Any armed groups attacking HSZ will want to physically capture or destroy command elements and resources within HSZ rather than trying attack to with long range weapons.
  11. If attacked from near benefited due to the increased ability to close in by mixing up with civilians while facing any attack from front, SF defences in HSZ will fall and face disastrous effects losing lot of life and resources.

  12. If the civilians are allowed to enter, threat on survivability of all HSZ are equally increased including the once facing uncleared areas.
  13. As peace or development will never come without security it is not advisable to weaken security of Jaffna peninsula and also aim at peace and development.
  14. As SF presently does not have 100 % superiority over the LTTE military capability, it is not advisable to take risks unless SF capabilities are developed to be able to remain 100 % superiority over LTTE thus any short term drawbacks can be overcome and regain initiative to avoid disasters

  15. If there is a threat for HSZ from immediate front/close proximity, rear or within due to resettling in HSZ to cater for such a situations, additional troops deployments will be required.
  16. FACTORS AFFECTING RESETTLEMENT

  17. Humanitarian Requirement. Resettlement in HSZ deserves serious concern as per the Humanitarian angle and the whole issue should be seen from following perspectives.

  1. There are about 10000 houses affected due to existence of HSZ.
  2. Due to prolonged displacement education of Jaffna students have been hampered.
  3. Due to displacement cultural values and tradition are been disturbed.
  4. Due to displacement civilian have become more vulnerable to the activities undemocratic forces.
  5. Displaced people have been socially handicapped and virtually face discrimination.
  6. Displaced people will be deprived of the service and infrastructure facilities afforded to normal civilians.
  7. Having displaced people will have a direct adverse impact on the economy of the region.

  1. Political agenda of the government. As the government is committed to the peace process to bring about lasting peace for Sri Lanka it is of paramount importance for the government to be concerned about the plight of the displaced people. Government should take all possible measures in this regard without disturbing the security requirements in order to retain its initiative to achieve long term success. Fol [following] areas should be included in the political agenda of the GOSL.

  1. Take sufficient interest on resettlement followed up with rehabilitation.
  2. Request for foreign donor assistance for development of affected areas and people.
  3. Take necessary steps to win hearts and minds of people affected.
  4. Mobilize all government ministries and departments etc for the purpose of successful resettlement of people by solving infrastructure facility problems.
  5. Provide an environment which encourages and assist in practicing democratic politics.

  1. Security. This is given the highest consideration as resettlements are going to take place within the areas declared as HSZs where most of the key installations are situated. Following factors needs to be given due consideration in order to ensure security is not compromised.

  1. Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in a such a way that SF should not compromise its security at any stage.
  2. Security can be relaxed only in stages in relation to de-escalation of LTTE. ie disarming of cadres and decommission of LTTE long range weapons.
  3. Effective and accurate system of activities has to be planned out for both LTTE and GOSL in coordination with SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] to ensure security will not be hampered and because of the resettlement of troops the defence layout should not be exposed to the civilians.
  4. Security of command and logistic elements to be ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive defenses, air and sea communication agencies should not be sacrificed.
  5. Security of IDP [Internally Displaced persons] also to be considered as equally important because, they may be vulnerable to terr [terrorist] activities, mines/IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] which are available in HSZs.
  6. Govt [Government] infrastructure-facilities transport agencies are vulnerable.
  7. Security of law enforcement agencies had to be considered for smooth functioning of the govt authority.

  1. Infrastructure Facilities. It is important that following facilities are required to be provided before the resettlement proper takes place in the HSZs.

  1. Electricity
  2. Transport
  3. Housing
  4. Medical
  5. Repairs to the road network
  6. Communication systems
  7. Education

  1. Finance and rehabilitation. This requirement will go hand in glove as civilians will require financial assistance to reconstruct their dwellings and also arrangements to be made regarding dry rations. Financial assistance will also be required to develop infrastructure facilities to readjust SF deployment. Assistance may be sought from NGOs.
  2. SLMM representatives. It is required to make an understanding between the SLA [Sri Lanka Army] and LITE in many areas. Following requirements to be looked into.

  1. Expansion of the monitoring mission by additional numbers.
  2. Enhance the mandate to cover more security issues.
  3. Since the LTTE is indirectly interfering with the deployment of security forces, SLMM assistance is required to minimize the security threat. For this purpose SLMM mandate should be amended to give more authority/power.

  1. Neutral body to supervise de-escalation. It is essential to have a neutral organization with sufficient number of staff to make a formidable force to monitor the implementation of the de-escalation process. This neutral body should be in a position to act as mediators with the respective theatres during the implementation of the de-escalation process. This body should work in liaison with the govt, Norwegian facilitators and LTTE regarding the progress of the implementation of de-escalation. SLMM may perform this task better.
  2. DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs

  3. De-escalation proposals in relation to resettlement in HSZs are given at annex ‘A’.
  4. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

  5. Implementation plans for resettlement has to be worked out in relation to de-escalation proposals given in this proposal under following headings. It is also required to come to an agreement by the govt with the LTTE under SLMM supervision to work out the implementation.

  1. Areas to be resettled including boundaries to be identified.
  2. Clearing of mines.
  3. Demarcation of prohibited areas/No Go areas.
  4. Enumerate the legitimate ownership.
  5. Financial support and rehabilitation.
  6. Providing infrastructure facilities.
  7. Essential services.
  8. Working out of a detail security system which will be revised from time to time as per deployments oh ground.
  9. Action plan for de-escalation in relation to resettlement.

  1. Following hotels and houses can be vacated for intended use/resettlement as early as possible as follows.

  1. Subash Hotel – By Mid June 2003.
  2. Gnanam Hotel – By End March 2003.
  3. Houses around above two hotels in Jaffna Town – About 80 in numbers – By Mid July 2003
  4. Private houses in Chavakachcheri – By End 2003.*
  5. Private houses in other areas – By Mid 2004.*

* Above ‘d’ and ‘e’ would facilitate handing over of houses occupied by the Security Forces on a continuing basis, as and when alternative accommodation is constructed.

  1. As recommended by the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation on 14 December 2002, it is expected financial requirements are provided by the government to SLA, commencing mid January 2003. Further, as stated in Oslo during the last negotiations, the SLA does not anticipate any objections from the LTTE on new relocation sites, as such responses would cause further delay.
  2. Following areas can be considered for early resettlement provided De-escalation proposals have been finalized and agreed as per the security requirements stated in the annex ‘A’.

  1. Area west of Keerimalai. (Annex A)
  2. Kovilakkandy. (Annex B)

  1. This report/proposals will have to be studied and approved by the higher authorities.

Date: 20 December 2002

GSC FONSEKA RWP RSP rcds psc
Major General
Commander
Security Forces (Jaffna)

Copies:
Secretary of Defence
Comd of the Army
Comd of the Navy
Comd of the Air Force


ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs
SECURITY THREAT UNDER PRESENT SITUATION – OUT SIDE HSZs

SRL NO

HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS

IDENTIFIED THREATS

RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS

REMARKS

1

Resettling of displaced persons to be carried out only for those families lived in the area before 1991 in Palaly HSZ and before 1995 in Nagarkovil, Muhamalai Thanankilappu, Ariyalai and beach road Jaffna.

Resettlement of Armed groups aid sympathizers in close proximity to camps.

Possible only in selected areas.

Restriction on visitors into resettled areas is required.

2

Enforcing deterrent Police action against violence.

Provoke people against SF to discharge violence.

Restriction on unlawful assemblies

Explore legality of imposing restrictions over areas outside HSZ and within HSZ.

3

SLMM mandate to be enhanced to check suspected safe houses of armed groups org [organisations] in cleared areas and create a system to monitor availability/distribution of arms ammo [ammunition] found in uncleared areas too.

Availability of LTTE military hardware including missiles in the cleared areas and uncleared areas.

SLMM/neutral observers to guarantee the removal of the threat before resettlement.

4

Conducting of counter insurgency operations

Develop military capability in HSZ

No resettlement.

Nil

5

Declaration of permanently abandoning of suicide missions and remove of such personnels with assistance of Police/SLMM intentions are identified.

Suicide cadres threat on SF movements and VIPs/VVIPs.

Will differ resettlement

Detrimental effect on confidence buildings

6

SLMM to prevent terrorist taking control over selected areas and ensure safe passage of SF. Conduct sporadic checks of safe houses and offices by SLMM to monitor above.

Hinder the mobility of SF confined to a restricted area by armed groups activities.

Resettlement to commence if the threat is eliminated.

SLMM mandate to be enhanced

7

Take all measures to prevent armed groups achieving the capability mentioned in identified threat. SLMM to continue spot checks on SF request for arms and ammo. Withdraw of LTTE weapons in forward lines and dumping them in rear/storage south of Kilinochchi under SLMM supervision.

Create situation within cleared areas. Tie down available troops in the belly thus depriving assistance to FDLs.

No resettlement unless the preventive measures are successful.

Nil

8

Police to be geared to take actions against hostile elements.

Hostile behaviour of people IDPs not yet resettled.

Expedite the resettlement process/ relocate where resettlement not possible.

Requirement of housing projects.

9

Ensure present security systems are effectively practiced and SLMM to keep checks on fishermen and sea tigers going to sea from uncleared areas.

Fishermen resettled in coastal areas sympathetic to armed groups movements.

Resettlement must not hinder the defence potential.

More applicable to defences facing Lagoons.

10

SLMM to remove such facilities available with LTTE. Also decommissioning of indirect weapon systems to be arranged.

Capability of passing accurate information to bring down accurate indirect fire by the people resettled.

Restrict the area of resettlement as there should not be radio communication from close proximity of HSZs.

Amend SLMM mandate.


ANNEX B

SECURITY THREAT AFTER CIVILIANS ARE RESETTLED IN HSZS

SRL. NO.

HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS

IDENTIFIED THREATS

RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS

REMARKS

1

Authority to search houses and personnel on suspicion. Also to continue regular checks on entry/ exit points. LTTE will not be allowed to do politics in HSZ.

Military cadres with forge identities will enter HSZs.

Only the people provide their legitimate ownership before 1991/95. LTTE members will not be allowed to resettled.

Nil

2

People resettled will not be allowed to go into prohibited areas.

Ability to attack VPs, VIPs possible

Only in selected areas.

3

Depriving communication facilities and decommissioning of indirect weapons to be done under SLMM supervision.

Accurate indirect fire could be brought down.

-DO-

Relocation of IDPs in crown land elsewhere where required.

4

Declare prohibited areas and legitimate search and arrest within HSZ and also decommissioning of missiles to be done.

Threat on security of air crafts and ships from within HSZ.

-DO-

5

Access to be denied to prohibited areas for civilians.

Ability to identify voids of defences.

-DO-

6

LTTE stop recruiting, total disarming of cadres and hand over weapons to SLMM

Reduce overall operational efficiency by reducing log [logistic] elements in HSZs. Thereby causing reduction of troops in the peninsula.

Resettlement to start after implementation

7

Avoid resettling of civilians in places from where Air port/ Harbour can be threatened and conduct regular checks and searchers and necessary to find hidden weapons etc. declaration of non-execution of underwater / seaborne suicide mission is also needed.

There will be a threat on harbour/air port when civilians resettle close to those locations.

Impose time restrictions on Entry/Exit points. Movement restrictions to be imposed during night. No entry/exit for fishing in HSZs. Resettlement on the coastal belt only in selected areas.

Make necessary arrangements to acquire land to enhance security/ development of harbour /airport

8

Retain buffer zones as much as possible for the defences specially in HSZs.

Armed groups mixed up with civilians may launch attacks where SF will not have sufficient reaction time.

No go areas to be declared separate. Entry/Exit points for different blocks of resettlement and also road networks should be worked out for selected resettlement areas. Such terrorist intentions will totally terminate resettlement.

Additional defence measures to be arranged.

9

Ground of tactical importance should be held by SF and any indication of such threat will be considered very seriously and preventive, deterrent action be taken immediately.

Options open to prepare fortifications in Ground of Tactical importance or selected areas. Eg: Vasavilan, Kadduvan, Thelippala and Keerimalai.

No resettlement in such areas

Maintain military strong points in Grounds of Tactical importance

10

Ownership of houses of displaced personnel who left before 1991/95 will be seriously considered when resettling.

Resettlement of sympathizes with forged identities to assist terrorist in offensive ops [operations] against SF.

Only in selected areas

Psy [psychological] ops and civil affairs operations to take special care of these families

11

Maintain and increase intelligence/survailance and early warning facilities and conduct regular searches of suspicious elements to enhance security of command, fire control and logistic elements

Possible attacks in VHSZs to paralise comd and control system support and log elements thereby prevent efficient conduct and supporting of def ops on FDLs.

Strict security checks on the civilians including house searches as required

12

Reduction of LTTE cadres in areas opposite cleared areas. Weapons withdrawn to be kept under SLMM custody.

SF is forced to contract or vacate certain part of HSZs thereby weakening/reducing the present military superiority in JFN [Jaffna] hence the power projection of LTTE beyond that of SF.

Resettlement will continue parallel to disarming

SLMM mandate to be enhanced and numbers to be increased.

13

To retain necessary amount of depth for the defences at any cost.

If resettled in HSZs as forced the defences to contract, SF will be forced to sacrifice depth of defences.

Resettle in the areas excluding areas which provide the depth.

Can be considered once threat has been reduced/ decommission-ing of weapons had taken place.

14

LTTE to deescalate by disarming and to retain a balance of power parallel to reduction of SF positions.

If the conflict escalates unable to go back to the original positions to regain initiative after civilians have been resettled.

If the threat is eliminated resettlement is possible

15

Reduce LTTE offensive capability by disarming and decommissioning of indirect weapons.

Due to the presence of civilians secrecy of SF defences will be sacrificed thus making defences vulnerable to armed group attacks.

Resettlement programme to be parallel to elimination of threat

-DO-

Source:

De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

ஒக்ரோபர் 13, 2006

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe’s Letter to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on FM Radio Transmission Facilities for the Use of LTTE Peace Secretariat

கோப்பு வகை: LTTE,Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 2:14 பிப

In response to a letter by President Chandrika Kumaratunga seeking clarification on the government permitting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to import FM transmission equipment, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sent a letter on January 3, 2003. He wrote the LTTE has not imported VSAT equipment and the consignment was received by Norway, thoroughly checked and moved to Killinochchi under armed guard.

Presented below is the full text of letter

3rd January, 2003
Her Excellency Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka,
Presidential Secretariat,
Colombo 1.

Your Excellency,

FM Radio Transmission facilities for the use of the LTTE Peace Secretariat

I write with reference to your letter of December 30, 2002 on the above subject and the attached copy of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway.

I presume you would have had the opportunity to see the Government’s statement on this matter, which was published in the media on the 28th of December, 2002. In case you have not, I am attaching a copy of this document for your information.

Since the Government’s statement contains much of the information regarding the concerns you have expressed in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, I shall only briefly elaborate on issues, which may require further clarification. I note too that we will have the opportunity of discussing this matter fully shortly.

In your enumeration of what you call “the relevant facts regarding this incident”, in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, you have taken up four specific matters.

1. The import in the consignment of a VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) communication unit, which you say, even the Government of Sri Lanka does not possess.

2. The inclusion of a Radio Data System (RDS) capable of sending data from point to point.

3. The FM frequency range in the equipment imported by the LTTE, which appears to be wider than the frequencies allotted to other FM radio stations operating in Sri Lanka.

4. The consignment of radio broadcasting equipment to the Embassy of the Royal Norwegian Government in Sri Lanka, intended for the use of the LTTE which was received and cleared from the Port of Colombo without payment of customs duty.

Let me briefly recapitulate what has been more comprehensively explained in the Government’s statement.

On October 1, 2002 the Political Headquarters of the LTTE in Kilinochchi informed my Secretary that the LTTE were now engaging in a dissemination campaign about the peace process and that they had purchased a new FM radio transmitter which they would like to bring to the Wanni. They requested that the relevant authorities be informed to give customs clearance for the equipment and that it would be appreciated if they could receive the equipment without delay and on a tax-free basis.

The Government decision on this, in principle, was that FM transmitting facilities should be provided since dissemination of information regarding the peace process, particularly in the North and East was important. As regards the matter of duty free import, the LTTE were to be informed that this concession could not be granted as it was against Government policy to make any exceptions regarding customs duty and VAT.

Thereafter, the LTTE were informed that a formal application with prescribed information, regarding such matters as location of the station, expected area of coverage, the power for transmission, frequencies and other operational details, programme composition etc., should be sent into the Ministry of Mass Communication, so that the application could receive full consideration by the Ministry and the TRCSL, before arriving at a final decision.

In arriving at our decision in principle to consider the LTTE’s request, the following considerations were uppermost in mind:

* That even at present, the LTTE are operating an unauthorised radio transmission facility popularly known as the ‘Voice of the Tigers’ (VOT). This, Your Excellency, as you are well aware, has been in operation for several years and has been totally uncontrolled by any governmental authority;

* The request for a licence, for the first time in the history of the 20-year conflict in which the LTTE has been engaged in with the Government, indicated a welcome change of attitude. It signalled the LTTE’s acceptance and willingness to come within the ambit of Sri Lankan law and regulation. In fact the Government is pleased that through the grant of such a licence to the LTTE Peace Secretariat, radio transmissions by the LTTE are being brought, for the first time, under the laws of Sri Lanka.

The licence that was finally given by the Ministry of Mass Communication on November 11, 2002 in terms of Section 44 of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Act No. 37 of 1966 subjects the holder of the licence, (that is the LTTE Peace Secretariat) to specific conditions regarding the content and manner of their future broadcasting.

The LTTE having a legal radio channel has to be placed in the context of the positive developments towards a permanent peace in Sri Lanka. You, yourself have referred at the commencement of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway the efforts made during your period of nearly 3 years to enter into direct negotiations with the LTTE.

Finally, and no doubt assisted by the foundation that you laid, it was possible for the Government through the signing of the MoU with the LTTE on 22nd February, 2002 to give practical effect to the commencement of the transformation of the LTTE from being, as you have said “one of the world’s most ruthless and murderous organisations” into a political grouping within the mainstream of the Sri Lankan political system.

I believe this profound paradigm shift, which is now in effect, has been favourably recognised and commented on publicly by the international community as well. Making available community radio broadcasting facilities, under regulation by the Government was seen as one way of encouraging forward movement in this positive direction.

Let me now deal with your concerns.

1. VSAT Communication Unit – Although one unit of VSAT communication equipment of value US Dollars 25,000 was listed in the list of items to be imported by the LTTE, and although the Government statement of 28th December presumed that it had been brought in with the FM radio equipment consignment, I am now informed both by the customs and the LTTE Peace Secretariat, that this unit (for which clearance had been approved by the TRCSL) was NOT shipped from Singapore and has NOT in fact been brought into the country.

Since your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway says that even the Government of Sri Lanka does not have such equipment, let me inform you that the SLT certainly does have VSAT communication facilities. In addition there are apparently 16 other authorised VSAT operators in the country in addition to several unauthorised ones.

Even some foreign correspondents are known to be using VSAT communication units for filing their reports overseas, up-linking to the satellite without going through the SLT international switch. You may recall that as far back as 1996 a facility based data communication system was given to the Ceycom Global Communication Ltd., which has now some 42 VSAT earth terminals in their system.

In this regard you might remember that the National Communication Policy which was approved by the Cabinet on the 13th of November, 2002 refers to the liberalisation of VSAT transmissions in the future in view of the well known fact that information communication technology has been very rapidly evolving across the world.

This will mean that in future any person could import VSAT equipment with the approval of the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (TRC). The up-linking frequency would of course need to be assigned by the TRC.

So in the light of what has been happening here and elsewhere your agitation in regard to VSAT equipment is unclear. Also you will undoubtedly be greatly relieved to know that the VSAT equipment has not been imported.

2. Radio Data System (audio)

The other question you have raised is that of the Radio Data System (RDS). This as Your Excellency may know is an essential part of a FM radio station and all private FM radio stations in Sri Lanka have this equipment. This cannot emit any radio frequency. The value of this equipment was only US Dollars 800.

3. FM frequency range

With reference to the FM frequency range, which you have also found suspicious, the explanation I believe is also quite simple. Different manufacturers evidently have different frequency bands in the FM radio system.

The English may manufacture within a certain frequency band and the US manufacturers in another. What is important is the spot frequency that is allocated by the TRCSL. In this case it is 98 Mhz which no existing operator has been assigned. The Regulatory Authority has the powers to monitor the frequency and the radiated power.

4. The role of the Norwegian Embassy

The major concern that you have referred in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway is that of the involvement of the Norwegian Embassy in assisting in the importation of the radio transmission equipment.

My observation on this is as follows:

The Government had decided that the acquisition of a FM radio transmission facility would enhance the peace process.

With the intention of assisting in this endeavour, the Government sought to utilise the good offices of the Royal Norwegian government which had done so much to facilitate the peace process to assist in the clearance of the equipment through the Customs. One of the reasons for obtaining the assistance of Norway was that as the facilitator, if the consignment was found to contain anything other than what was intended, that is, radio transmission equipment, the Government was going to disallow import and send the consignment back.

It was in these circumstances that the Norwegian Embassy acted as the consignee with the objective of transmitting the security cleared consignment to the SCOPP (the Peace Secretariat), which would in turn transmit it to the LTTE Peace Secretariat.

However even before this clearance was done, the Government took the step of ensuring that the items would be subject to the strictest check. A 4-member expert team consisting of senior officials of the Rupavahini Corporation, Sri Lanka Air Force, Sri Lanka Army and the Ministry of Mass Communications thereupon went to the Customs warehouse and after opening the packages examined all the equipment.

They confirmed that the equipment was such that was needed for FM radio transmissions and also made some technical observations. These have been conveyed to the LTTE Peace Secretariat for compliance. It was this team, which confirmed that the VSAT equipment was not among the list of items which were imported.

You will appreciate that the FM radio transmission equipment after checking was sealed and finally sent to the LTTE Peace Secretariat under armed guard.

This was done to prevent any other material being introduced into the packages or any items being removed.

The question that awaits settlement is that of the duty payable since, after import by the Embassy the goods were passed on to SCOPP, in the first instance and SCOPP is an agency of the Government.

The Minister of Finance will determine in the next few days the manner in which the issue of duty payable will be resolved. While endorsing your assertion that the Norwegian Government and its Embassy here have been always fully supportive of our efforts to consolidate the peace process, I must urge a note of caution in your intended intervention with the Prime Minister of Norway.

The Norwegian peace support team of Deputy Minister Vidar Helgessen, Mr. Eric Solheim and H.E. Jon Westborg have, as you know, been extremely active in facilitating the peace process. H.E. Jon Westborg, the Norwegian Ambassador has been in service here for almost six years and has an unrivalled experience of the ground realities in Sri Lanka.

It is known that the credentials of his successor have been handed over to the Foreign Ministry in mid-November and that on completion of his assignment in Colombo he will be shortly returning to Norway.

Undoubtedly the Government of Norway will continue to utilise his expertise. I think therefore that as a Government we should exercise due care, at this critical stage in the peace process, to ensure that the enthusiasm of the Norwegian facilitation and the momentum thus far generated continues undiminished. I trust the above clarifies some of the concerns you have raised.

I look forward to our further discussion at an early meeting. Since you have released copies of your letters to the media, I am doing so myself since the public need to be kept fully informed.

Yours sincerely,

Ranil Wickremesinghe,
Prime Minister.

செப்ரெம்பர் 28, 2006

உருவாகும் தமிழீழத் தேசமும் அதன் உட்கட்டுமானமும்

கோப்பு வகை: Uncategorized — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

உருவாகும் தமிழீழத் தேசத்தின் உட்கட்டுமானப் பணிகளைப் பற்றிய ஒரு பார்வையே இந்தக் கட்டுரையின் நோக்கமாகும். மலரும் தமழீழத்தின் முதற்கட்டமாக அதன் கட்டுமான பணிகள் எப்படி அமையப்பெறும் என தமிழீழப் பொருண்மிய மேம்பாட்டு நிறுவனத்தினரால் அந்த திட்டத்திற்காக ஒரு ஆரம்ப வரைபு இவை. அந்த ஆரம்ப வரைபின் தமிழீழ கட்டுமானம் எப்படி அமையும் எனப் பார்த்தால் அந்த கட்டுமானத்தை எட்டுப் பிரிவுகளாக பிரித்துள்ளனர். அவை முறையே

1) நகரங்கள்
2) தெருக்கள், இரும்பு பாதைகள், விமான நிலையங்கள்.
3) கடற் போக்குவரத்தும் துறை முகங்களும்.
4) மின்சாரம்.
5) தொலை தொடர்பு.
6) நீர்ப்பாசனம். நீர் முகாமைத்துவம்.
7) கைத்தொழில்
8) நீர்வழங்கலும் வடிகால் அமைப்பும்.

எனப் பிரிக்கப்பட்டு தமிழீழத் தேசத்தின் எல்லைகள் தெளிவாக தெரிந்து இருப்பதனால் மாவட்ட எல்லைகளையும் நிர்ணயித்து மாநிலங்களின் வளர்ச்சிகள் அனைத்தும் சமமானதாகவும் சீரானதாகவும் எல்லா பிரதேசங்களிடையேயும் சீரானதாகவும் எவ்வித வேறுபாடுகளும் இல்லாதவாறு எல்லா வளங்களும் கடல், விவசாயம். கைத்தொழில் என்பன எல்லாப் பிரதேசங்களிற்கும் அமையப்பெறக் கூடியதாக இருக்கும்.

மாநிலங்களை வகுக்கும் போதும் அவற்றின் எல்லைகளை நிர்ணயம் செய்யும் போதும் கூடியளவு புவியியல் சார் பொளதீக அம்சங்களிற்கு அமைய அதாவது ஆறுகள், ஏரிகள், கடனீரேரிகள் என்பனவற்றிற்கு முன்னுரிமை கொடுக்கப்படும். புதிய மாநிலங்கள் உருவாகும் போது தமிழீழத்தின் எதிர்கால தேசியத் தேவைகளிற்கு முன்னுரிமை வழங்கப்படும்.

தமிழீழ நிர்வாக வலையங்கள்

தமிழீழத்தில் மொத்தமாக இருபது மாநிலங்களாக பிரிக்கப்பட்டு அவை ஒவ்வொன்றின் பெயர்களும் முன்மொழியப்பட்டுள்ளன. தமிழீழ மாநிலங்களின் (மாவட்டங்கள் ) ஆட்சிப் பிரதேங்கள் தற்போதைய மாவட்ட ஆட்சிப் பிரதேசங்களை விட சிறியதாயினும் உதவி அரசாங்க அதிபர் பிரிவுகளிலும் பாரக்க பெரியனவாகும்.

தமிழீழத் தேவைகள் மற்றும் இலக்குகள் என்பனவற்றின் அடிப்படையைப் பொறுத்து யாழ் மாவட்டம் இரண்டாகவும், கிளிநொச்சி மாவட்டம் மூன்றாகவும், மன்னார் மாவட்டம் இரண்டாகவும், புத்தளம் மாவட்டம் மூன்றாகவும், திருகோணமலை மாவட்டம் மூன்றாகவும், மட்டகளப்பு மாவட்டம் மூன்றாகவும், அம்பாறை மாவட்டம் இரண்டாகவும் பிரிக்கப்பட்டு வவுனியா மற்றும் முல்லைதீவு மாவட்டங்களிலிருந்து மாங்குளம் பிரிக்கப்பட்டு தனிமாநிலமாக உருவாகும்.

யாழ்ப்பாணக் குடாநாடு இயற்கையாகவே தொண்டமனாறு மற்றும் நாவற்குழி நீரேரிகளால் வலிகாமம் பிரதேசத்திலிருந்து தென்மராட்சி மற்றும் வடமராட்சி பிரதேசங்கள் பிரிக்கபடுகின்றன. இதனடிப்படையில் யாழ்குடாநாடு இரண்ட மாநிலங்களாகப் பிரிக்கபடும். அவை முறையே

1) நல்லூர் மாநிலம்:- இப்பகுதியில் தற்போதைய வலிகாமும் தீவகமும் அடங்கும் இங்கு சனத்தொகை அதிகமாக இருப்பதோடு வளமான செம்மண்ணும் உண்டு.

2) வறணி மாநிலம்:- இப்பகுதியில் வடமராட்சி தென்மராட்சி பச்சிலைப்பள்ளி பிரதேசங்கள் அடங்கும். இங்கு சனத்தொகை குறைவாகவே காணப்படுகிறது.
தென்மராட்சியில் நெற்பயிர்ச்செய்கை வளமாக உள்ளதோடு பளைப்பிரதேசத்தில் தென்னைப்பெருத்தோட்டப் பயிர் வளம் அதிமாக உற்பத்தி செய்யலாம். வடமராட்சி பகுதிகளில் கடல் வளமும் மற்றும் வடமராட்சி கிழக்குப் பகுதிகளில் கடல் வளத்தை மேலும் திட்டமிட்டு அபிவிருத்தி செய்யலாம். வறணி நிர்வாக பிரதேசத்தில் அபிவிருத்திக்கான வாய்ப்புக்களும் புதிய அபிவிருத்தி திட்டங்களை செயற்படுத்த போதிய நில வளமும் வசதிகளும் உள்ளன.

3) கரைச்சி மாநிலம் :- இது கிளிநொச்சி பரந்தன் வட்டக்கச்சி பகுதிகளை உள்ளடக்கியது. இதன் வடக்கு எல்லையாக யாழ்குடா நீரேரியுள்ளது. விவசாயம் இப்பிரதேசத்தின் பிரதான வளமாகும்.

4) பூநகரி மாநிலம்:- இதன் மேற்கு எல்லை மன்னார் வளைகுடாவாகும். பூநகரிப் பெருநிலப் பரப்பு எங்கள் ஆதிக் குடியிருப்புக்கள் காணப்பட்ட பிரதேசமாகும். இங்கு நெற்செய்கை பிரதானமாகும் அத்துடன் தமிழர் பாரம்பரியம் பற்றிய அகழ்வாராச்சிகள் மேற்கொள்ள வேண்டிய பிரதேசமுமாகும்.

5) முல்லைதீவு மாநிலம்:- இது முன்னைய முல்லைத்தீவு மாவட்டத்தின் பெரும் பகுதியை கொண்டதாகும் இதில் மணலாறுப் பிரதேசமும் அடங்கும். இதன் கிழக்கு கரையோரம் வங்காள விரிகுடாவாகும். கடல்வளம் விவசாய வளம் என்பன இப்பகுதியின் பிரதான வளங்களாகும்.

6) மாங்குள மாநிலம்:- இது தற்போதைய முல்லைத்தீவு, மன்னார், கிளிநொச்சி, மற்றும் வவுனியா மாவட்டங்களை உள்ளடக்கிய பகுதியாகும். வடமாகாணத்தின் பிரதான நிர்வாக மையம்(மாநகரம்) மாங்குளத்தில் அமையும். எனவே இதனைக் கருத்திற் கொண்டு இப்பிரதேசம் பரப்பளவில் பெரிதாக அமையுமாறு நிர்ணயம் செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளது.

இங்கு ஒரு குறிப்பு மாங்குளத்தை மாநகரமாக அமைப்பதற்கான தொடர்ச்சியான ஆராச்சிகள் இடம்பெற்று சில முரணான தரவுகளும் கிடைக்கபெற்றள்ளது அவை போதியளவு நீர்வளமின்மை மற்றும் வளமான காடுகள் அழிக்கபடவேண்டிய அபாயமும் ஏற்படலாம் என்று அத்தரவுகளால் தெரிய வருவதனால் அவை உறுதிப்படுத்துமிடத்து வடமாநிலத்தின் தலைநகர் முறிகண்டியில் அல்லது கொக்காவிலிற்கு மாற்றப்படலாம்.

7) மன்னார் மாநிலம்:- மன்னார் மாவட்டம் மாந்தை மற்றும் மடு என்று இரண்டு நிருவாக பிரதேசமாக பிரிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது .

8) மாந்தை மாநிலம்:- இது மன்னார். தலை மன்னார். திருக்கேதீஸ்வரம் .கட்டுக்கரை குளம் .என்பனவற்றை உள்ளடக்கும்.இங்கு நெற்செய்கை மற்றும் கடல் வளம் தரமான களிமண் வளமும் உண்டு.

9) மடு மாநிலம்:- இப்பகுதி பிரதானமாக காடுகளை பேணும் இடமாகவும் மிருகங்கள் மற்றும் பறைவைகள் சரணாலயமாக பேண படும் அதைவிட புகழ்பெற்ற மடுமாதா ஆலயமும் இங்கு அமைந்திருப்பது இந்த பகுதிக்கு முக்கியத்துவத்தை கொடுப்பதாகும்.

10) வவுனியா மாநிலம்:- இப்புதிய மானிலம் கால்நடை அபிவிருத்திக்கு முக்கியத்துவம் அளிக்கபடும் அத்துடன் விவசாயம்

11) திருகோணமலை மாநிலம்:- தமிழீழத்தின் தலைநகராக் இப்பிரதேசம் அமையும் எனவே தமிழீழத்தின் நிர்வாக பிரதேசமாக இப்பகுதி அமைவதுடன் அயற்பகுதிகளான சீனன் குடா மற்றும் தம்பலகாமம் பகுதிகளிற்கும் தலைநகர் அபிவிருத்தி விரிவடையும்.

12) குச்சவெளி மாநிலம்:- இது தற்போதைய வட திருகொணமலை மாவட்டத்தில் இது அடங்கும் இதன் வட எல்லை முல்லை _திருகோணமலை எல்லைகளாகும். தெற்கு எல்லை கொறவப்பொத்தானை நெடுஞ்சாலையும் நிலாவெளியும் ஆகும்.

13) மூதூர் மாநிலம்:- இதன் எல்லைகளாக மகாவலிகங்கையாகவும் மற்ற எல்லைகள் தற்போதைய திருகோணமலை மற்றும் மட்டு எல்லைகளாகும். இப்பிரதேசம் விவசாயம் மற்றும் கடல் என்பன இதன் பிரதான வளங்களாகும்.

14) மட்டகளப்பு மாநிலம்:- இதன்கீழ் முதலாவதாக வாகரை மானிலம். இது புதிய நிருவாக பிரதேசம் ஆகும் இது பெரிய நீர் பரப்புடையதாகவும் தற்போதைய தற்போதைய மட்டகளப்பு மாவட்டத்தின் வடபகுதியாக இது அமைவதுடன். இதன் தெற்கு எல்லை முகுந்தன் ஆறு ஆகும்.

15) அம்பாறை மாவட்டம்:- இது சமநிலபரப்புடையதாக இரண்டாக பிரிக்கபடும்
(1) அக்கரைப்பற்று மாநிலம்
(2) பொத்துவில் மாநிலம்
இங்கு நெற்செய்கையும் விலங்கு வேளாண்மையும் பிரதானமாகும். வல்லவெளி பிரதேசம் தற்போதைய அம்பாறை மற்றும் மட்டகளப்பு மாநிலங்களின் பகுதிகளில் அடங்கும் . மட்டகளப்பின் தெற்கு எல்லை பிரதேசமாக செனத்தொகை அதிகம் கொண்ட பட்டிருப்பு பிரதேசம் அமையும்.

16) புத்தளம் மாவட்டம்:- புத்தளம் மாவட்டம் மூன்றாக பிரிக்கபடும் அவை
(1) அறுவாக்காடு மாநிலம்
(2) புத்தளம் மாநிலம்
(3) சிலாபம் மாநிலம்
எனப் பிரிக்கபட்டு இங்கு நெற்செய்கை மற்றும் கடல் வளங்கள் அபிவிருத்தி செய்யப்படும்

தொடரும் ……………..

ஆக்கம் :: சாலினி சாத்திரி

மூலம்:

உருவாகும் தமிழீழத் தேசமும் அதன் உட்கட்டுமானமும்

செப்ரெம்பர் 27, 2006

Vaddukoddai Resolution

கோப்பு வகை: Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

The Resolution was adopted at the first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on 14 May 1976. TULF’s participation in the 1977 general elections was anchored in this Resolution. In this Resolution, the TULF declared its intent of forming a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam. S. J. V. Chelavanayakam presided over the Convention. The following is a translation of the Resolution, which was originally adopted in Tamil.

Whereas, throughout the centuries from the dawn of history, the Sinhalese and Tamil nations have divided between themselves the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country in its Southern and Western parts from the river Walawe to that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the Northern and Eastern districts; And,

Whereas, the Tamil kingdom was overthrown in war and conquered by the Portuguese in 1619, and from them by the Dutch and the British in turn, independent of the Sinhalese Kingdoms; And,

Whereas, the British colonists, who ruled the territories of the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms separately, joined under compulsion the territories of the Sinhalese and the Tamil Kingdoms for purposes of administrative convenience on the recommendation of the Colebrooke Commission in 1833; And,

Whereas, the Tamil leaders were in the forefront of the freedom movement to rid Ceylon of colonial bondage which ultimately led to the grant of independence to Ceylon in 1948; And,

Whereas, the foregoing facts of history were completely overlooked, and power over the entire country was transferred to the Sinhalese nation on the basis of a numerical majority, thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of subject people; And,

Whereas, successive Sinhalese governments since independence have always encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism of the Sinhalese people and have used their political power to the detriment of the Tamils by:

(a) Depriving one half of the Tamil people of their citizenship and franchise rights thereby reducing Tamil representation in Parliament,

(b) Making serious inroads into the territories of the former Tamil Kingdom by a system of planned and state-aided Sinhalese colonization and large scale regularization of recently encouraged Sinhalese encroachments, calculated to make the Tamils a minority in their own homeland,

(c) Making Sinhala the only official language throughout Ceylon thereby placing the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and the Tamil language,

(d) Giving the foremost place to Buddhism under the Republican Constitution thereby reducing the Hindus, Christians, and Muslims to second class status in this country,

(e) Denying to the Tamils equality of opportunity in the spheres of employment, education, land alienation and economic life in general and starving Tamil areas of large scale industries and development schemes thereby seriously endangering their very existence in Ceylon,

(f) Systematically cutting them off from the main-stream of Tamil cultures in South India while denying them opportunities of developing their language and culture in Ceylon, thereby working inexorably towards the cultural genocide of the Tamils,

(g) Permitting and unleashing communal violence and intimidation against the Tamil speaking people as happened in Amparai and Colombo in 1956; all over the country in 1958; army reign of terror in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1961; police violence at the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974 resulting in the death of nine persons in Jaffna; police and communal violence against Tamil speaking Muslims at Puttalam and various other parts of Ceylon in 1976 ––all these calculated to instill terror in the minds of the Tamil speaking people, thereby breaking their spirit and the will to resist injustices heaped on them,

(h) By terrorizing, torturing, and imprisoning Tamil youths without trial for long periods on the flimsiest grounds,

    1. Capping it all by imposing on the Tamil nation a Constitution drafted, under conditions of emergency without opportunities for free discussion, by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the Soulbury Constitution distorted by the citizenship laws resulting in weightage in representation to the Sinhalese majority, thereby depriving the Tamils of even the remnants of safeguards they had under the earlier constitution; And,

Whereas, all attempts by the various Tamil political parties to win their rights, by co-operating with the governments, by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary agitations, by entering into pacts and understandings with successive Prime Ministers, in order to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with the self-respect of the Tamil people have proved to be futile; And,

Whereas, the efforts of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress to ensure non-domination of the minorities by the majority by the adoption of a scheme of balanced representation in a Unitary Constitution have failed and even the meager safeguards provided in article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution against discriminatory legislation have been removed by the Republican Constitution; And,

Whereas, the proposals submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi for maintaining the unity of the country while preserving the integrity of the Tamil people by the establishment of an autonomous Tamil State within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon were summarily and totally rejected without even the courtesy of a consideration of its merits; And,

Whereas, the amendments to the basic resolutions, intended to ensure the minimum of safeguards to the Tamil people moved on the basis of the nine point demands formulated at the conference of all Tamil Political parties at Valvettithurai on 7th February 1971 and by individual parties and Tamil members of Parliament including those now in the government party, were rejected in toto by the government and Constituent Assembly; And,

Whereas, even amendments to the draft proposals relating to language, religion, and fundamental-rights including one calculated to ensure that at least the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1956 be included in the Constitution, were defeated, resulting in the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by a large majority of the Tamil members of Parliament; And,

Whereas, the Tamil United Liberation Front, after rejecting the Republican Constitution adopted on the 22nd of May, 1972, presented a six point demand to the Prime Minister and the Government on 25th June, 1972, and gave three months time within which the Government was called upon to take meaningful steps to amend the Constitution so as to meet the aspirations of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the six points, and informed the Government that if it failed to do so the Tamil United Liberation Front would launch a non-violent direct action against the Government in order to win the freedom and the rights of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the right of self-determination; And,

Whereas, this last attempt by the Tamil United Liberation Front to win Constitutional recognition of the rights of the Tamil Nation without jeopardizing the unity of the country was callously ignored by the Prime Minister and the Government; And,

Whereas, the opportunity provided by the Tamil United Liberation Front leader to vindicate the Government’s contention that their constitution had the backing of the Tamil people, by resigning from his membership of the National State Assembly and creating a by-election was deliberately put off for over two years in utter disregard of the democratic right of the Tamil voters of Kankesanthurai, And,

Whereas, in the by-election held on the 6th February 1975, the voters of Kankesanthurai by a preponderant majority not only rejected the Republican Constitution imposed on them by the Sinhalese Government, but also gave a mandate to Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. and through him to the Tamil United Liberation Front for the restoration and reconstitution of the Free Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam.

The first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front meeting at Pannakam (Vaddukoddai Constituency) on the 14th day of May, 1976, hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from Sinhalese and this Convention announces to the world that the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese ,who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.

And, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment to the setting up of a separated state of Tamil Eelam expressed by the Ceylon Workers Congress as a Trade Union of the Plantation Workers, the majority of whom live and work outside the Northern and Eastern areas,

This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam, based on the right of self determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country.

This Convention further declares:

  • That the State of Tamil Eelam shall consist of the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of the State of Tamil Eelam to all Tamil speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of Tamil Eelam.
  • That the constitution of Tamil Eelam shall be based on the principle of democratic decentralization so as to ensure the non-domination of any religious or territorial community of Tamil Eelam by any other section.
  • That in the state of Tamil Eelam caste shall be abolished and the observance of the pernicious practice of untouchability or inequality of any type based on birth shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any form punished by law.
  • That Tamil Eelam shall be a secular state giving equal protection and assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may belong.
  • That Tamil shall be the language of the State, but the rights of Sinhalese speaking minorities in Tamil Eelam to education and transaction of business in their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamil speaking minorities in the Sinhala State.
  • That Tamil Eelam shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labor shall be recognized, the means of production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while permitting private enterprise in these branches within limit prescribed by law, economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall be a ceiling on the total wealth that any individual of family may acquire.

This Convention directs the Action Committee of the Tamil United Liberation Front to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation;

And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is reached.

Source:

Vaddukoddai Resolution

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