Memorandum of Understanding – Cease-Fire Agreement 2002

தமிழில்

The Government of Sri Lanka and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to formalise their unilateral cease-fires which were in effect from December 24, 2001. The agreement was separately signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wikremesinghe on February 22 at Vavuniya and by LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran on February 21 at the LTTE’s political administrative office in Kilinocchi. The formal cease-fire, after the signing of the MoU took effect from cease-fire which took effect from 00:00 hours on February 23. The MoU was announced by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen, at a press conference in Oslo after the signatures of the two parties were obtained by the Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Jon Westborg. Norway has been playing the role of a mediator between the government and the LTTE in the peace process. This cease-fire would be the first between the two parties after another agreement signed in 1995 ended within 100 days. Two aspects that distinguish the 2002 Agreement from the 1995 agreement are that Norway and other Scandinavian countries would monitor the agreement and the two sides would have to give a two-week notice if they are to pull out of the agreement. In the 1995 agreement, each party needed to give only three days notice if it wished to withdraw from the cease-fire.

 

Sunday, 24th February 2002

Agreement on a ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Preamble

The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) recognize the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict. Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the Parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.

The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.

With reference to the above, the Parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this Agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.

Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire :

The Parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:

1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2 hereinafter referred to as D-day.

Military operations :

1.2 Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This require, the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;

b) Aerial bombardment;

c) Offensive naval operations.

1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.

Separation of forces :

1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of six hundred (600) metres. However, each Party reserves the right of movement within one hundred (100) metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of four hundred (400) metres between them. Where existing positions are closer than four hundred (400) metres, no such right of movement applies and the Parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.

1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.

1.6 The Parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, of Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the Parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day +30.

1.7 The Parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other Party.

1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day +30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

1.9 The Parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.

1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops, shall as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavuniya using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the SLMM.

1.11 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other Party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The Parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.

1.12 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (i.e. spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

1.13 Fifty (50) unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies. Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy

The Parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:

2.1 The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such as acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.

2.2 The Parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites, etc.) currently held by either of the parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

2.3 Beginning on the date on which this Agreements enters into force, school buildings occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day +160 at the latest.

2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the Parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.

2.5 The Parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.

2.6 The Parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.

2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the Parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.

2.8 The Parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.

2.9 The Parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.

2.10 The Parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.

2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted, within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.

2.12 The Parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

2.13 The Parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day +30.

Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission :

The Parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Both Parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this Agreement as follows:

3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).

3.2 Subject to acceptance by the Parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement.

3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the Parties and report to the RNG.

3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.

3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.

3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.

3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this Agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this Agreement at the lowest possible level.

3.9 The Parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.

3.10 The Parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the Agreement are alleged to have taken place. The Parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, of. Article 3.7.

3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and to enquire into and assist the Parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.

3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.

3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.

Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the Agreement :

4.1 Each Party shall notify its consent to be bound by this Agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Pirabaharan on behalf of the LTTE, respectively. The Agreement shall be initialled by each Party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.

4.2 The Agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4.3 This Agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both Parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.

4.4 This Agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either Party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination.

Annexes :

Annex A: List of goods

Annex B: Checkpoints

Annex A :

The Parties agree to ensure the flow of non-military goods, to and from LTTE dominated areas of the Northern and Eastern Province as well as unimpeded flow of such goods to the civilian population in these areas. Non military goods not covered by article 2.6 in the Agreement are listed below:

Non military arms/ammunition

Explosives

Remote control devices

Barbed wire

Binoculars/Telescopes

Compasses

Penlight batteries

Diesel, petrol, cement and iron rods will be restricted in accordance with the following procedures and quantities.

Diesel and petrol :

The Government Agents (GA) will register available vehicles; tractors and motorcycles in the LTTE controlled areas. The GA will calculate the required weekly amount of diesel and petrol based on the following estimate:

Trucks/Buses 250 litre/week

4 wheel tractor 310 litre/week

2 wheel tractor 40 litre/week

Petrol vehicle 30 litre/week

Motorcycles 7 litre/week

Fishing vessels 400 litre/week

Cement :

Cement required for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Government property; registered co-operatives; or approved housing projects implemented by the GOSL and international NGOs and more affluent members of the society; will be brought in directly by relevant institutions under licences issued by Government Agents. The GA shall stipulate the monthly quantities permitted for such project based upon planned and reported progress.

Cement required for individual shops/constructions/house owners rehabilitation initiatives will be made available through the co-operations on a commercial basis.

Cement required for individual shops/constructions/house owners/rehabilitation – initiatives will be made available through the co-operations on a commercial basis. The monthly import for this purpose will be limited to 5000 bags during the first month and thereafter 10,000 bags/month. Individual sales by the co-operatives will be registered and limited to 25 bags per household.

Iron rods :

Iron rods for building constructions will be brought in to the LTTE controlled areas under licences issued by the GA.

A monthly reassessment will be made to assess the possibilities of removal of the above restrictions.

Annex B :

Checkpoints agreed in section 2.7 are as follows:

- Mandur, – Paddirupur, – Kaludaveli Ferry Point, – Anbalantivu Ferry Point, – Mamunai Ferry Point, – Vanvunateevu, – Santhiveli Boat Point, – Black Bridge, – Sitandy Boat Point, – Kiran bridge, – Kinniyadi Boat Point, – Valachenai, – Makerni, – Mahindapura, – Muttur, – Ugilankulam, – Omanthai.

 

Sources:

Memorandum of Understanding

Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka

தமிழில்

 

1. The Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka was held on June 9 and 10 in Tokyo with the participation of Ministers and representatives from 51 countries and 22 international organizations. The Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, and the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe made opening statements. The opening session was chaired by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Representative of the Government of Japan.

2. Japan, Norway, the United States and the European Union (Presidency and Commission) functioned as co-chairs of the Conference. Representatives of the co-chairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi; State Secretary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Olav Kjoerven; Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Richard L. Armitage; Mr. Ioannis Theophanopoulos, representing the Presidency of the European Union; and Mr. Bernhard Zepter, representing the European Commission, delivered statements at the opening session. The President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Mr. Tadao Chino also delivered a statement at this session, followed by a video message from the President of the World Bank, Mr. James Wolfensohn.

3. In the operative session, the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Mr. A. S. Jayawardena reported on economic developments and prospects of Sri Lanka. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reported on Sri Lanka’s macro-economic performance and the reconstruction and development agenda of Sri Lanka. The ADB and the United Nations (UN) system reviewed the “Needs Assessment” of the North and East prepared by the World Bank, the ADB and the UN system in full consultation with the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Civil society organizations were consulted during this process.

4. In the plenary session, participating countries and international organizations presented statements which identified their intention to provide economic assistance to Sri Lanka. Presentations were made on the contributions of civil society organizations and of private enterprise to the development objectives of the country.

History of the Sri Lankan Peace Process

5. The armed conflict in Sri Lanka in the last two decades has claimed more than 65,000 lives, and has resulted in more than 800,000 internally displaced persons and a large number of refugees from the North and East. The current peace process commenced in 2000, when Sri Lankan President, Ms. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, and LTTE leader, Mr. Vellupillai Pirapaharan, asked Norway to serve as the impartial facilitator for peace negotiations. The Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE entered into a mutual cease-fire agreement on February 23, 2002, with the able facilitation by Norway. Since September 2002, six sessions of talks have been conducted between the two parties and significant progress has been achieved. Participating countries and international organizations, which met in Oslo on November 25, 2002, committed themselves to providing immediate humanitarian assistance in support of the peace process. In April 2003, a pre-Tokyo Seminar was held in Washington DC chaired by the US Deputy Secretary of State with a view to building political momentum for the Tokyo Conference.

Objectives of the Conference

6. The objectives of the Conference are to provide the international community with an opportunity to demonstrate its strong and unified commitment to the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka and to encourage the parties to redouble their efforts to make further progress in the peace process. While only one party to the peace process is present at the Conference, the international community takes the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to support the establishment by the parties of the necessary administrative structure for the effective reconstruction and development of the North and East. A partnership between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE will be necessary to rebuild these areas effectively. Adequate safeguards to secure the interests of all other communities should be included in this framework.

7. The Conference takes note of the economic challenges faced by the country and in this context endorsed the Government’s “Regaining Sri Lanka” initiative, which is a comprehensive programme to develop Sri Lanka on a balanced and equitable basis.

8. Participants express their regret over the absence of the LTTE from the Tokyo Conference. The Conference provides the Government of Sri Lanka with an opportunity to reaffirm its determination topursue the peace process, and focus on the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka.

Importance of the Conference in Promoting the Peace Process

9. Participants express the view that a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka will be a landmark achievement with regard to peaceful resolution of an armed conflict. The Conference commands both parties for their commitment to a lasting and negotiated peace based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the Conference stresses the importance of bringing tangible dividends of peace to all the people of Sri Lanka.

Balanced Humanitarian and Economic Assistance

10. The Conference notes the importance of urgent humanitarian assistance as well as medium to long-term assistance to rebuild the conflict-affected areas in the North and East, and to assist in the development of the entire country. The Conference emphasizes the importance of taking full account of the delicate ethnic and geographical balance in providing assistance. The Conference welcomes the “Needs Assessment” of the North and East, which identified needs in the conflict-affected areas. The donor community expresses its willingness to extend assistance to Sri Lanka based on the source material provided for the Conference namely, “Regaining Sri Lanka”, the “Needs Assessment” of the North and East, the “Needs Assessment” for the conflict-related districts adjacent to the North and East, and the Bridging Document, which links the “Needs Assessments” and “Regaining Sri Lanka”.

Support Indicated by the Donors

11. The participating donor countries and international organizations have demonstrated their willingness to extend assistance to the entire country, to a cumulative estimated amount, in excess of US $ 4.5 billion over the four year period, 2003-2006. In addition, some countries and international organizations have offered technical support. Others have indicated that their commitments are based upon an assumption of a viable peace process.

12. Several countries and international organizations have specified significant part of their assistance to the North and East. A number of them have indicated that disbursement of such assistance will keep pace with satisfactory progress in the peace process; and others have indicated that, given such progress, they would be willing to consider making additional commitments.

Channels of Assistance to the North and East

13. The international community remains committed to supporting humanitarian relief and human rights protection, and takes the opportunity to encourage the parties to reach agreement on an innovative administrative structure for the reconstruction and development of the North and East. The international community also reiterates its commitment to cooperate with the parties for this purpose. This structure will itself contribute to the process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The Conference recognizes with satisfaction that implementation of some humanitarian assistance projects is already taking place in the North and East through bilateral and multilateral channels in cooperation with local and international NGOs. The Conference also welcomes the establishment of the “North-East Reconstruction Fund (NERF)”, which is to be administered by the World Bank, as an important channel for assistance to the North and East. The Conference also emphasizes the need for flexibility by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in accepting various forms of assistance from the donor community. The donor community also expresses its willingness to assist capacity building to enhance good governance so as to ensure accountable, transparent, speedy and efficient implementation of projects supported with its assistance.

Importance of Strong and Growth Oriented Macro-Economic Policy

14. The Conference notes that it is imperative for the Government of Sri Lanka to implement the sound macro-economic policy delineated in “Regaining Sri Lanka”. The Conference stresses the need to adopt economic policies aimed at reducing poverty. Sustainable development also depends upon economic growth and job creation as well as encouragement of private enterprise.

Progress of the Peace Process

15. The Conference notes that during the past sessions of the peace talks, significant progress was achieved. Donors remind the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE of the importance for both parties to make their utmost efforts to further promote the peace process founded upon the principles reflected in the Oslo Declaration. Donors recognize the urgent need to support the people in the conflict-affected areas of the North and East, and make allocations towards this purpose. With regard to the North and East, priority-setting and project-implementation will take place with the Government working in partnership with the LTTE, and with adequate safeguards for the interests of all communities. The Conference expects that the government will ensure that the assistance pledged by the donor community to the reconstruction and development of the North and East is utilized specifically for that purpose.

16. The Conference also urges the parties to move expeditiously to a lasting and equitable political settlement. Such a settlement should be based upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this regard, the Conference looks forward to the parties reaching early agreement on a human rights declaration, as discussed at the sixth session of peace negotiations at Hakone.

17. The Conference welcomes the LTTE’s commitment to the negotiated peace process, and urges the LTTE to return to the peace talks as soon as possible. The people in the conflict-affected areas of the North and East must be able to enjoy the dividends of peace immediately. Manifest commitment by both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to further the peace process will be necessary for the provision of international assistance to the reconstruction and development of the conflict-affected areas of the North and East.

Linkage between donor support and progress in the peace process

18. Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo. The Conference encourages the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to enter into discussions as early as possible on a provisional administrative structure to manage the reconstruction and development aspects of the transition process. The process would need the expeditious development of a roadmap with clear milestones indicating the path towards a mutually acceptable final political solution. With this in view, the international community intends to review and monitor the progress of the peace process closely, with particular reference to objectives and milestones including:

a. Full compliance with the cease-fire agreement by both parties.

b. Effective delivery mechanisms relating to development activity in the North and East.

c. Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration of the fourth session of peace talks in Thailand.

d. Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the principles of the Oslo Declaration.

e. Solutions for those displaced due to the armed conflict.

f. Effective promotion and protection of the human rights of all people.

g. Effective inclusion of gender equity and equality in the peace building, the conflict transformation and the reconstruction process, emphasizing an equitable representation of women in political fora and at other decision-making levels.

h. Implementation of effective measures in accordance with the UNICEF-supported Action Plan to stop underage recruitment and to facilitate the release of underage recruits and their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

i. Rehabilitation of former combatants and civilians in the North and East, who have been disabled physically or psychologically due to the armed conflict.

j. Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on a phased, balanced and verifiable de-escalation, de-militarization and normalization process at an appropriate time in the context of arriving at a political settlement.

Inputs from Civil Society Organizations and Private Enterprise

19. The Conference welcomes the inputs from the civil society meetings held in Colombo on 26-27 April 2003 and in Tokyo on 8 June 2003. The Conference is of the view that the intensity and continuity of involvement on the part of civil society organizations are essential to achieve success in the challenging task undertaken by the parties. The Conference is encouraged by the dynamic role played by private enterprise. The Conference also recognizes the contribution of academic communities, trade unions, professional groups, religious organizations and others.

Monitoring and Review

20. In view of the linkage between donor support and progress in the peace process, the international community will monitor and review the progress in the peace process. In implementing its own assistance programmes, the donor community intends to take into careful consideration the results of these periodic reviews. With full regard to the position of Norway as the facilitator, Japan, in co-operation with the United States and the European Union, will undertake necessary consultations to establish the modalities for this purpose as early as possible.

Follow-up Action

21. The Conference requests the Government of Japan, as the host country, to convey the outcome of the Conference to the LTTE.

 

List of Participating Countries and International Organizations of Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka 09 and 10 June 2003, Tokyo

Commonwealth of Australia

Republic of Austria

People’s Republic of Bangladesh

Kingdom of Belgium

Federative Republic of Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Kingdom of Cambodia

Canada

People’s Republic of China

Kingdom of Denmark

Arab Republic of Egypt

Republic of Finland

French Republic

Federal Republic of Germany

Hellenic Greece

State of the City of Vatican

Republic of Iceland

India

Republic of Indonesia

Islamic Republic of Iran

Ireland

State of Israel

Republic of Italy

Japan

Republic of Korea

State of Kuwait

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

Malaysia

Kingdom of Nepal

Kingdom of the Netherlands

New Zealand

Kingdom of Norway

Sultanate of Oman

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Republic of the Philippines

Portuguese Republic

Russian Federation

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Republic of Singapore

Republic of South Africa

Spain

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Kingdom of Sweden

Swiss Confederation

Kingdom of Thailand

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

United States of America

Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

Organizations

European Commission

Asian Development Bank

Asian Productivity Organization

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

International Committee of the Red Cross

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

International Fund for Agricultural Development

International Labor Organization

International Monetary Fund

International Organization for Migration

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

United Nations Secretariat

United Nations Human Settlement Programme

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Population Fund

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

United Nations Children’s Fund

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

United Nations World Food Programme

World Health Organization

World Bank

 

Source:

Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)

தமிழில்

The following is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) signed between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on June 24, 2005.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)

Preamble

WHEREAS the tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004 (the “tsunami”) destroyed human lives and property on an unprecedented scale;

WHEREAS there is an urgent need for all communities, Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and others, to cooperate on humanitarian grounds in the face of this common adversity;

WHEREAS the equitable allocation of post-tsunami funds to all parts of Sri Lanka struck by the tsunami will be based on accepted needs assessments;

WHEREAS in recognition of this urgent humanitarian need and in a spirit of partnership, the Government of Sri Lanka (the “GOSL”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “LTTE”) (the “Parties”) have resolved to work together, in good faith and using their best efforts, to deliver expeditious relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development to the coastal communities in the six districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee (the “Six Districts”) and to facilitate and expedite the process of rebuilding the affected areas;

WHEREAS there is a need for establishing P-TOMS to facilitate such cooperation among communities, and between the Parties;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing the Parties have entered into this MOU and agreed as follows:

1. Structure

a. An integrated operational management structure shall be established for the purpose of planning, implementing and coordinating post tsunami work. Such structure shall consist of:

i. The Post-Tsunami Coastal Reconstruction Committee (the “High-Level Committee”);

ii. The Post-Tsunami Coastal Reconstruction Committee for the Six Districts (the “Regional Committee”); and

iii. Post-Tsunami Coastal Reconstruction Committees for each of the Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Trincomalee districts (the “District Committees”).

b. The High Level Committee, the Regional Committee and the District Committees shall discharge of their functions in such a manner as to address the concerns of all persons in the Tsunami Disaster Zone (the “TDZ”, as defined below) and shall do so without discrimination against any person on grounds such as ethnic origin, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, social origin, birth or other status.

2. Scope

a. The scope of the High-Level Committee, the Regional Committee, and the District Committees shall be limited to performing the functions defined in Sections 5(b), 6(b), and 8(b), respectively, and having effect exclusively within the TDZ (as defined below), as further specified by Section 6(a) in the case of the Regional Committee and by Section 8(a) in the case of the District Committees.

b. The Tsunami Disaster Zone (the “TDZ”) shall be defined as the area affected by the tsunami.

c. The TDZ shall include all that tsunami-affected land area of Sri Lanka which is adjacent to the sea, lying within a limit of 2 kilometres landwards from the mean low water line.

d. The High-Level Committee may decide to bring additional land areas within the TDZ; provided, however, that all such land areas must have been directly impacted by the tsunami or directly affected by the displacement and resettlement of persons as a result of the tsunami.

e. New proposals for measures to be adopted in, or affecting the coastal areas covered by seawater shall be undertaken under the aegis of an international agency. Such proposals might include measures to recover material lost to the sea during the tsunami, the cleaning up of shores and beaches affected, even when covered by seawater, and the repairing and construction of jetties or commercial fisheries harbours affected by the tsunami.

f. The Ceasefire Agreement, dated as of 23 February 2002, between the GOSL and the LTTE, shall continue in full force and effect, and nothing in this MOU shall be construed to prejudice such agreement or alter its terms in any way.

3. Period of Operation

a. This MOU shall enter into force from the date it is executed by both Parties (the “Commencement Date”) and continue in operation for a period of one year from the Commencement Date.

b. The Parties shall by consensus have the option to extend this MOU for an additional period or periods.

4. Cost and Expenses

The donors shall be requested to cover all costs and expenses incurred relating to the establishment and functioning of the P-TOMS.

5. High-Level Committee

a. Geographic Scope. The High-Level Committee shall act exclusively in relation to the TDZ.

b. Functions. The High-Level Committee shall perform the following functions:

i. Formulation of policies for the equitable allocation and disbursement of donor funds in the TDZ based on needs assessments submitted to the High-Level Committee, guided by the principle that funds should be allocated in proportion to the number of affected persons and the extent of damage;

ii. Provision of advisory services; and

iii. Monitoring of the functioning of P-TOMS.

c. Composition. The High-Level Committee shall consist of the following members:

i. 1 nominee by GOSL;

ii. 1 nominee by LTTE; and

iii. 1 nominee by Muslim parties.

d. Alternates. Each nominating party shall designate one alternate who will be authorized to attend meetings and act on behalf of the member only in the event he or she is unable to attend due to illness, necessary travel or other exigent circumstances.

e. Chairperson. The High-Level Committee shall select one of the members of the High-Level Committee to serve as the chairperson to conduct and coordinate its meetings. The role of the chair shall rotate among the members with each chairperson serving for two months.

f. Observers. The High-Level Committee shall have one observer representing multilateral donors and one observer representing bilateral donors attend its meetings. The observers shall be nominated by the multilateral donor community and the bilateral donor community, respectively.

g. Decision Making.

i. The High-Level Committee shall strive to make decisions based on consensus. All members shall work together in good faith and use their best efforts to reach a common agreement before the High-Level Committee makes any decisions.

ii. In the event that consensus cannot be reached the members shall immediately enter into an extensive consultation procedure with their nominating parties and the donor community with the aim to reach an agreement and to ensure continued cooperation in the High-Level Committee.

iii. In the event that consensus can still not be reached the nominating parties may after having followed the consultation procedure laid down in Section 5(g. i and ii) and after having given 14 days notice, suspend the cooperation in the High-Level Committee.

h. Location. The High-Level Committee shall be located in Colombo.

i. Procedures. The High-Level Committee shall determine its own procedures for the discharge of its functions.

j. Servicing Secretariat. The High-Level Committee shall establish a small independent secretariat with adequate staff.

6. Regional Committee

a. Geographic Scope. The Regional Committee shall act exclusively within those areas of the TDZ in the Six Districts.

b. Functions. The Regional Committee shall perform the following functions:

i. Development of strategies for implementation and prioritization of post-tsunami emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development measures;

ii. Project approval and management with respect to projects for post-tsunami relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development;

iii. Overall monitoring of projects; and

iv. Fund management, with respect to the fund specifically defined in Section 7.

c. Composition. The Regional Committee shall consist of the following members:

i. 2 members nominated by GOSL, out of which one will serve as Deputy Chairperson;

ii. 5 members nominated by LTTE, out of which one will serve as Chairperson;

iii. 3 members nominated by the Muslim parties, out of which one will serve as Deputy Chairperson;

iv. The Regional Committee shall have a proper gender balance.

d. Observers. The Regional Committee shall have one observer representing multilateral donors and one observer representing bilateral donors attend its meetings. The observers shall be nominated by the multilateral donor community and the bilateral donor community, respectively. Other observers may be invited to attend the meetings of the Regional Committee.

e. Decision Making.

i. The Regional Committee shall strive to make decisions based on consensus. All members shall work together in good faith and use their best efforts to reach a common agreement before the Regional Committee makes any decisions.

ii. In the event that consensus cannot be reached, decisions shall be made by a simple majority of the Regional Committee. In the event of equality of votes, the Chairperson can exercise a casting vote.

iii. Not withstanding paragraph iv below, in the event that a decision is taken on an issue having an adverse effect on a minority group, acknowledged by at least two members of the Regional Committee, approval will require two thirds majority (seven members) of the Regional Committee.

iv. In the event that a proposal from a District Committee does not get a simple majority in the Regional Committee and at least two members of the Regional Committee request redressing of the decision relating to the proposal, the rejection will require two thirds majority (seven members) of the Regional Committee.

f. Location. The Regional Committee shall be located in Kilinochchi.

g. Procedures. The Regional Committee, in consultation with the High Level Committee shall determine the procedures for the discharge of its functions.

h. Servicing Secretariat. A small Secretariat for the Six Districts shall be set up and may draw staff from the Secretariat for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). The Secretariat shall be named as the Regional Secretariat for Post-tsunami Coastal Reconstruction and Development (RSPCRD), and shall provide secretarial and administrative services to the Regional Committee.

i. Project Management Unit. A Project Management Unit (the “PMU”) shall be established to manage the projects approved by the Regional Committee.

j. Accounting. The Regional Committee shall appoint a suitably qualified, independent accountant.

7. Regional Fund

a. There shall be a Post-Tsunami Coastal Fund for the Six Districts (the “Regional Fund”), consisting of unspecified (program) and secretariat funds. The unspecified (program) funds shall consist exclusively of foreign funds while the secretariat funds shall consist of both foreign and local funds.

b. The Parties shall appoint a suitable multilateral agency to be the Custodian of the Regional Fund.

c. The purpose of the Regional Fund shall be to expeditiously make available funds, following proper approved procedures, to facilitate and accelerate the relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development program in the tsunami-affected areas of the Six Districts.

d. The Parties and the Custodian shall agree on a mechanism for the establishment and operation of the Regional Fund.

8. District Committees

a. Geographic Scope. Each District Committee shall act exclusively in relation to those areas of the TDZ within its district.

b. Functions. Each District Committee shall perform the following functions within its district

i. Identification of needs;

ii. Prioritization of needs;

iii. To generate, receive, appraise and prioritize project proposals from various stakeholders and submit recommendations to the Regional Committee; and

iv. To monitor and report on project progress to the Regional Committee.

c. Composition and Decision Making. The Districts Committees, already established and well-functioning, shall continue their work. The District Committees may further discuss and decide on issues relating to their composition and decision-making. Adequate Muslim representation shall be ensured. The District Committee shall also have a proper gender balance.

d. Location. Each District Committee shall be located within its district.

e. Servicing Secretariat. A small Servicing Secretariat shall provide secretarial and administrative services to the District Committees.

9. Execution

This MOU may be executed in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

 

Source:

MoU for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure

Statement by Head of Delegation, Government of Sri Lanka at the opening session of the talks between Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, 22 February 2006

Statement by SL Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva Head of Delegation, Government of Sri Lanka at the opening session of the talks between Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, 22 February 2006, follows:

Hon. Minister Erik Solheim and the Facilitation team, Mr. Anton Balasingham and members of the LTTE delegation, Colleagues,

I. Introduction

On behalf of H.E. the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa and the Government of Sri Lanka, I am pleased to make these preliminary comments at the commencement of the talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government and hosted by the Government of Switzerland. At the outset, let me thank all the parties, including the Co-Chairs, who have worked tirelessly to make this event a reality.

At this stage, I would also like to express the hope of the Government and the People of Sri Lanka that these discussions will mark a significant chapter in the dialogue between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. It is also our wish that this dialogue would form the basis of a meaningful ceasefire where the beneficiaries of it would be all the People of Sri Lanka.

An analysis of successful negotiations worldwide would perhaps establish the fact that successes have resulted on occasions where parties to the conflict have had the courage, dedication and determination to pursue a solution through a continuous process of dialogue with sincerity. We should keep in mind that no issue is insurmountable, if the interests of the People and the Country are kept uppermost in our minds. Accordingly, it is our desire to express our views in a frank and forthright manner, rather than to make vague and ambiguous statements that would serve no useful purpose, although they may appear more acceptable on the surface.

As we all know, H.E. the President Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected on a platform of seeking an “honorable peace.” On that basis, our delegation affirms and emphasizes the position of the Government of Sri Lanka that the Ceasefire Agreement entered into between the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and Mr. V. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE on the 22nd February 2002 is contrary to our Constitution and law. Furthermore, it is prejudicial to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that certain benefits flowed to the People from the observance of the ceasefire, which resulted in our strong determination and desire to preserve the ceasefire.

We also consider the ceasefire as a first step to arrive at a negotiated settlement to the ongoing conflict and we propose to rectify certain grave anomalies arising from the agreement.

Since assuming office, our President has at various times and occasions extended invitations to begin a dialogue with the LTTE. Furthermore, our Government has been keen that the overall process of discussion and dialogue should be of an inclusive nature since it affects the whole Nation. We take pride in the fact that the Government’s participation at these talks in Geneva is with the support and goodwill of all the democratically elected political parties in Sri Lanka.

The discussions at the All Parties Conference held over the past few weeks resulted in the consensus that we initiate this dialogue with the LTTE. These discussions also served to prepare a common platform for the dialogue that we are commencing today with renewed hopes and expectations. This fact is significant since it is the first time in the history of this conflict that such a consensus has been reached. Therefore, I am privileged and honored to lead the Government’s delegation that is in Geneva today with the strong support from the Peoples’ representatives of Sri Lanka.

II. A Fresh Approach

H.E. President Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected to office on 17th November 2005 with a mandate from the Nation to work towards the achievement of an honourable peace. The Mahinda Chintana, which encapsulates the President’s vision for the country, makes it clear that the President has recognized the need for a direct dialogue with the LTTE, in the pursuit of such a goal. He has even stated that he is prepared to meet with the Leader of the LTTE and other representatives for such discussions. Notwithstanding the clear enunciation of such a position, it was unfortunate that upon assumption of office, H.E. the President was confronted with a number of acts which would easily qualify as being highly provocative. Such acts had the potential to disturb and deflect us from the path of dialogue and discussion. However, our President with his deep commitment to peace, reacted with patience and restraint to contain the tension that resulted from these acts of provocation and hostilities.

This enlightened response was certainly not a sign of weakness, but a display of our firm commitment to peace. We are therefore thankful to the international community for their steadfast encouragement for the commencement of these discussions. It is also our considered view that in the event such provocations had continued unabated, the repercussions may have been extremely dangerous with further loss of lives and the ceasefire becoming totally meaningless and leading to its eventual collapse.

Let me at this stage assure all, that it is the desire of H.E. President Rajapaksa to look at issues from a fresh perspective to find a sustainable solution to the conflict that engulfs our country. Let me also re-iterate that our Government is committed to talk, listen and think afresh.

III. Democracy and Human Rights

Sri Lanka is one of Asia’s most long-standing democracies. The people have enjoyed uninterrupted universal franchise since 1931, long before gaining independence in 1948. For over 65 years, our people have elected their own representatives to Parliament, from all ethnic groups. Both within the confines of Parliament and beyond, the right to criticize both the Government and the Opposition is an integral part of the freedom of expression. We must therefore ensure that all citizens of our country, wherever they may live, are free to exercise their franchise at free and fair elections, whether they be Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim, Malay, Burgher or any other group however small in numbers. The democratic process must prevail. Accordingly, no community or any section of a community should be deprived and denied their right to vote freely and to exercise their right to elect the representatives of their choice to whom they would entrust leadership.

It was a sad day for democracy in our country when at the Presidential Elections of November 2005, the LTTE forced the people in certain districts to observe a boycott of elections through coercion and general intimidation. It was a gross violation of democratic rights. In addition, the widespread rigging and corrupt election practices in many parts of the North at the general elections in April 2004 which was confirmed by the international election monitors could also be cited as further evidence of the LTTE’s disregard for democracy. It is in that context that the Government of Sri Lanka sincerely hopes that with a meaningful ceasefire, the people in the North could participate freely in the democratic process. We are confident that these sentiments will also be endorsed by the international community where such democratic norms prevail.

Mindful of the respective rights of the ethnic and religious groupings as enshrined in the Constitution, our Government is committed to maintaining the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and pluralist character of Sri Lanka. All persons irrespective of their race, religion, caste or gender are equal before our law. All our people whichever part of Sri Lanka they live in, are protected by these basic fundamental rights. These rights must not be truncated in any part of Sri Lanka, thereby depriving those persons of equality before the law. It is unfortunate that the LTTE has unlawfully deprived the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese of these fundamental and human rights, recognized in our law and in international law, in particular in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the North of Sri Lanka.

As we all know, as a result of the ceasefire that has been in effect since February 2002, the LTTE has been able to engage itself in political activity. At that time, it was the intention that other political parties, too, should also be permitted to engage themselves in political activity in the North and East without hindrance. However, it is regrettable that this aim could not be achieved due to the LTTE’s hostile acts, including the assassination and abduction of political activists, which has obstructed the legitimate political activity of others. It is our hope that we would be able to move towards the restoration of the democratic values which are so important in a civilized society.

IV. Ceasefire Violations

As set out in the preamble of the Agreement on a Ceasefire between the then Prime Minister Hon. Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE, entered into on 22nd February 2002, four years to the day today, the importance of bringing the end to hostilities and improving the living conditions of all persons affected by the conflict was recognized. An end to hostilities was also seen as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards a lasting solution could be taken.

However, the available evidence suggests that the LTTE had taken undue and unfair advantage of the ceasefire to strengthen its military capability. Repeated calls by the Government of Sri Lanka, the SLMM, and the international community to the LTTE to desist from such behavior has unfortunately not been heeded. This has resulted in a large number of significant violations which has seriously undermined the spirit of the ceasefire and threatened its termination.

The number of ruled violations by the LTTE as determined by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) since the beginning of the ceasefire up to the end of last month is a massive 3519. In comparison, the SLMM has determined that the GOSL has violated the agreement on 163 occasions. This shows that 96% of all violations have been committed by the LTTE. The violent incidents committed by the LTTE include assassinations, child recruitment and kidnappings, abductions of adults, suicide missions, killings of military and civilian persons, harassment of students and political workers, and destruction of property. Such incidents have seriously undermined the sustainability of the ceasefire and disturbed the return to normalcy for civilians in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North and East.

At this moment, we also wish to pay tribute to one of the great statesmen of our times, the late Hon. Lakshman Kadirgamar, President’s Counsel, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka. Hon. Lakshman Kadirgamar was internationally respected, widely acclaimed and highly honored. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he toiled hard pursuing a solution to our conflict. The fact that such a person was assassinated by the LTTE when the ceasefire was in force demonstrates the disregard with which the agreement had been treated and also highlights the significant deficiencies of the current ceasefire.

These circumstances underscore the inherent weaknesses in the existing ceasefire agreement as well as the lacuna in setting out norms for its effective implementation. These also show that the lack of sanctions being attached to violations when there are clear determinations made by the SLMM, is a very serious shortcoming that needs to be addressed in the interest of all concerned.

In expressing its views about the ceasefire, the Government of Sri Lanka must take into account the concerns of all of the people of Sri Lanka. The Government takes this obligation seriously and has engaged in consultations with representatives of all ethnic communities in preparing for these talks. In this context, we also wish to raise some of the concerns of the Muslim community with regard to the ceasefire.

As we all know, almost the entire Muslim community in the North was forcibly expelled by the LTTE during the time of the conflict. Families were ordered to leave their homes with only the possessions they could carry in their hands, on a few hours notice. Lives were lost, homes abandoned, and businesses forced to shut down. It was the hope of the Muslim people that the ceasefire would create the conditions that would enable them to feel secure to return to their homes and re-establish their lives. Unfortunately, most of these internally displaced people still linger in refugee camps or have been resettled elsewhere. Muslim people also face serious challenges to their security in the East, where incidents of violence threaten the civilian population at regular intervals.

It is the belief of the Government of Sri Lanka that the dialogue about the ceasefire would take into account the urgent concerns of the Muslim community. Accordingly, these issues and interests must be adequately addressed for the ceasefire to be meaningful.

V. Children Affected by the Armed Conflict

The Government of Sri Lanka has always endeavored to respect the rights of children. We have demonstrated this commitment by becoming a party to the major international human rights conventions, including the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. This convention casts upon the Government, the obligation to protect the rights of all Sri Lankan children including children affected by armed conflict.

Well before assuming office as President, H.E. President Mahinda Rajapaksa had earned himself an outstanding reputation as a champion of human rights and as an ardent advocate for safeguarding the rights of children. It was therefore not surprising that as soon as he was elected as President, he established a new ministry for children to provide for the legal and social conditions to protect all children and ensure their welfare. Naturally therefore, we are seriously concerned whenever the denial of these rights takes place within the territory of Sri Lanka as it is contrary to our law, international obligations and the basic fundamentals of a civilised society.

In the context of the Government of Sri Lanka’s overall commitment toward children and the obligations it has undertaken under international law, we find the violations of the rights of children committed by the LTTE as being totally unacceptable and deeply distressing.

The use of children by the LTTE in combat has been extensively documented by the SLMM, UNICEF, and other international agencies. According to UNICEF documentation, 5368 children are known by UNICEF to have been recruited by the LTTE, a figure that UNICEF acknowledges is under-representative of the actual number. Since the beginning of the ceasefire through 30 January 2006, the SLMM has ruled 2,011 violations against the LTTE for incidents of child recruitment and abduction; this number represents 55% of the total violations of the Ceasefire Agreement. UNICEF has also reported that child recruitment and kidnapping is continuing unabated as per their latest report of January 2006. Notwithstanding the concerns of almost the entire world community, it is sad that the LTTE has continued to demonstrate their disregard for the rights of children. The recent incident where three Government police officers associated with the National Child Protection Agency were abducted by the LTTE while the officers were in pursuit of a known pedophile is a clear illustration of this unfortunate situation.

The importance and urgency of addressing the issue of child soldiers has been recognized by the United Nations Security Council, which in its recently passed Resolution 1612 urged strong action to be taken against parties that recruit and abduct underage children into their ranks. The LTTE has been identified as such a violating party in a Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, despite repeated international condemnations of the incidents of recruitment and abduction of children, the violations continue to occur. It is the Government of Sri Lanka’s fervent hope that a dialogue on this issue could contribute to creating a meaningful ceasefire, one in which all children of Sri Lanka are free to blossom and develop themselves into healthy and productive members of society.

VI. Law and Order

One of the cornerstones of a democracy is an environment of security. Without law and order and its enforcement, individuals are not free to exercise the full range of rights they are entitled to. Freedom of speech and the right to engage in political activities are meaningless if the exercise of these rights could lead to abduction or death. A state of ceasefire does not override the existing law and order mechanisms in society. For this reason, the Government of Sri Lanka deplores the large number of killings of Sri Lankans of various ethnic groups after the ceasefire of February 2002. These killings have seriously undermined the ceasefire. The Government expresses its grave displeasure and disappointment that deficiencies in the ceasefire agreement have been exploited in this manner, leading to serious strains being placed on the enforcement machinery of our system of law and order.

The Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is committed to maintaining law and order without discrimination in every part of our country. His new administration initiated a program that extensively cracked down on organized criminals, underworld gangs, armed groups and narcotics dealers. This program is continuing with great intensity today. Criminals, whichever part of the country they operate in, are subject to this crack-down as the scope of this program covers the entire country. On that basis, the Government has already taken all necessary action to bring the perpetrators of certain recent crimes to justice in accordance with the due process of law. The murders of youth in Trincomalee, the reported abductions of members of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, TRO, the assassination of Parliamentarian Joseph Pararajasingham and all other reported incidents are being diligently investigated by our law enforcement authorities and we are taking all necessary action to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice.

It is also clear that certain parties with vested interests are attempting to accuse and discredit the Government of Sri Lanka for various alleged incidents. A critical examination of some of the recent allegations indicates that the media had been informed of some incidents well before such incidents have even been brought to the notice of the law enforcement authorities. In some cases, evidence has not been freely forthcoming and hardly any cooperation has been extended by the complainants. Such behaviour casts serious doubt on the reliability and authenticity of the complaints themselves. These facts seem to suggest that some of these allegations may have been cleverly stage managed and hence we wish to inform the international community that such incidents would have to be more extensively investigated prior to opinions being expressed about the veracity of the claims.

VII. Economic development

From the first day of his election to the office of President, the Government of H.E. the President Mahinda Rajapaksa has demonstrated its unwavering commitment to achieve substantial and sustainable economic development in all parts of the country. It is our stated goal to bring prosperity to all citizens of Sri Lanka. It is with that objective in mind that the Government has invested heavily in provincial development. In particular, the Government recognizes that the Northern and the Eastern provinces should be accorded special attention so as to enable these areas to expeditiously recover from the devastation of the conflict and the tsunami.

It is in this context that the Mahinda Chintana has enumerated a series of development projects to expeditiously solve the problems of the people living in the Northern and Eastern provinces. These proposals have been given life through appropriations in the budget that was presented by H.E. the President. As a Government, we are committed towards implementing these projects so as to restore accelerated economic activity.

The Government is also fully aware that the people of the North and the East have suffered tremendously in the wake of the tsunami that struck our country in December 2004. We have already implemented many schemes to provide relief to the tsunami affected people with the consultation and participation of the affected communities.

In our view, certain violations of the ceasefire have resulted in serious economic hardships being caused to farmers, fishermen, and others involved in economic pursuit in the Northern and Eastern provinces. For example, in the Jaffna district, monetary surcharges are imposed on farmers and they also undergo tremendous difficulties in the transportation of their produce. Such factors result in lowering the prices that they could command for their produce. Consequently, their earnings are reduced considerably. The Government of Sri Lanka is concerned about the plight of these farmers and others whose living standards have declined as a result of the restrictive practices imposed by the LTTE. We believe these issues too, should be resolved so as to restore normalcy in the economic conditions in the North and the East.

The Government sincerely believes that taking steps towards establishing a meaningful and effective ceasefire would be one of the most important initiatives to provide for the improvement of the economic conditions of the people in the North and the East.

It is our earnest hope that our discussions would pave the way for the realization of such a ceasefire, which would thereby lead to a peaceful environment that is so important for economic development and investment.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Hon. Minister Erik Solheim and the Facilitation team, Mr. Anton Balasingham and members of the LTTE delegation, Our talks today marks a new beginning. Given the pragmatism, courage and far-sightedness of H.E. the President, we are confident that this beginning could be nurtured towards the achievement of the goals we have set ourselves.

We recognize, however, that the path ahead is likely to be one of challenge and complexity. Nevertheless, we sincerely believe that we should leave no stone unturned to bring about a peaceful environment in our country. We fervently hope that the LTTE would also respond with sincerity to develop a framework that would result in the cessation of hostilities and embark on the path of non-violence.

We owe that duty and commitment to our people wherever they may live.

Source:

Sri Lanka Government’s opening statement at Geneva

LTTE issues Communiqué in Oslo

June 9, 2006
Oslo, Norway

The de facto State of Tamil Eelam exercising jurisdiction over 70 percent of the Tamil Homeland, with control over the seas appurtenant there, with its own laws, independent judiciary, police force and full administrative apparatus; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), being the authentic representative of the Tamil Nation and its sole interlocutor in the current peace process facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government; the LTTE acting as the sole defender and protector of the Tamil Nation, its People and the State institutions with its modern defence forces;

Noting that the Tamil Nation’s peaceful resistances over a period of three decades by non-violent means were brutally crushed by the Sinhala Nation;

Noting that such brutal crushing was due primarily to the absence of balance of power;

Noting the reality that in international relations, it is the balance of power which would ensure a democratic relationship between parties to the conflict that would ensure a just and equitable resolution of national conflicts;

Noting that the LTTE wants just peace and normalcy for the suffering People of the Tamil Nation declared a unilateral ceasefire December 2000;

Noting that when the GoSL dismissed the LTTE’s positive gesture in declaring a unilateral ceasefire and initiated the Agnikela battle, the LTTE again demonstrated the balance of power and opened the door for peace once again by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in December 2001, which with the facilitation of the Royal Norwegian Government resulted in the Ceasefire Agreement signed on February 22, 2002;

Noting that the Ceasefire Agreement was entered into outside the scope of the Constitution of the Sinhala Nation;

Noting that prior to the commencement of peace talks the LTTE repeatedly stated that the immediate goal of the talks was the establishment of an interim administration for the purpose of addressing the urgent humanitarian problems of the people of the northeast, including displaced persons from the High Security Zones;

Noting that during the war children were traumatized with the presence of the army in schools and the Ceasefire Agreement required their removal from schools;

Noting that the Sinhala political party that won the parliamentary election in 2002 ran on a platform of establishing an interim administration in the northeast;

Noting that when the Sinhala political party that represented the GoSL at that time indicated that if it entered into talks on the proposed interim administration it would be removed from power by the Sri Lankan President, the LTTE showed flexibility and dropped its call for an interim administration, because it did not want the negotiating process to break down;

Noting that the mechanisms agreed on by the GoSL and the LTTE in lieu of the interim administration of a joint task force and subcommittees did not materialize due to delays and obstruction by the GoSL;

Noting that even though the purview of the above mentioned mechanism was the northeast, the LTTE accommodated an equal membership of the GoSL and thereby gave the GoSL veto power on the affairs of the northeast;

Noting the reneging of the GoSL pledge to seek funds for the development as equal partner with the LTTE by convening a donor conference in Washington prior to the Tokyo conference, without the participation of the Tamil Nation, and attempting to isolate it in the international arena resulting in the non- participation of the Tamil Nation at the Tokyo Conference of donor countries;

Noting the failure of the GoSL armed forces to vacate civilian homes, schools and places of worship in accordance with the CFA and humanitarian laws, thereby preventing many thousands of Tamil refugees and internally displaced persons from returning to their homes in the High Security Zones;

Noting the failure of the GoSL to avoid traumatization and mental torture of children in schools by not removing their armed forces’ presence from the schools and in fact by increasing their presence in schools with combat-ready weapons and body searches including girls in the presence of male armed personnel;

Noting that the objective of the CFA is to preserve the status-quo and the balance of power, and donor countries including the Co-Chairs have assisted the government in providing military equipment and assistance that could result in a shift in the balance of military power;

Noting the repeated assertions of the GoSL that it has established a “international safety net” against the LTTE and the International Community’s failure to repudiate them;

Noting that in view of the above developments, the LTTE suspended talks to make the GoSL move on to the next stage in a meaningful manner and to exert pressure on the GoSL to fulfill the pledges it made;

Noting that in three separate incidents at sea in 2003 the lives of 26 LTTE members were taken and the LTTE’s merchant vessels were sunk in international waters, and the restraint shown by the LTTE;

Noting that several proposals for interim administration made by the GoSL did not meet the legitimate expectations of the Tamil Nation and would have resulted in the same ineffectiveness of the previous mechanisms;

Noting the submission of the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) by the LTTE incorporating democratic principles, elections, independent judiciary, independent human rights commission, transparency and accountability;

Noting that the representatives of the Muslim Community have the right to participate in formulation of their role in the ISGA and protection of the interest of northeastern Muslims in accordance with international human rights norms;

Noting that when the GoSL agreed to recommence talks on the basis of the ISGA, the President at the time dissolved parliament on February 7, 2004;

Noting the landslide victory of the Tamil National Alliance comprising TULF, ACTC, TELO and EPRLF(Suresh faction), which contended in general election on the mandate that LTTE was the sole representative of the Tamils;

Noting the suspension of the facilitation by the Norwegian government due to the confusion and lack of clarity created by the GoSL;

Noting the devastation of the island by the tsunami irrespective of race or religion;

Noting the international community’s commitment to provide relief in a just and equitable manner to the victims of the tsunami in the northeast and south;

Noting that the tsunami washed away the livelihood of the Tamils already devastated by the 20-year war;

Noting the GoSL’s prevention of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s planned humanitarian visit to the tsunami-affected areas in the northeast;

Noting the proposal for establishment of a post-tsunami operational management structure (P-TOMS) by the Royal Norwegian Government;

Noting the LTTE’s flexibility in accepting the P-TOMS and its hopes that the spirit of cooperation would compensate the lack of political power and structural infirmity of the P-TOMS;

Noting the scuttling of the P-TOMS by the judicial branch of the GoSL;

Noting that as a result of the scuttling by the judiciary, the massive aid pledged by the international community did not reach the tsunami victims of the northeast;

Noting that in the island of Sri Lanka, due to pervasive racism, the ethnic majority always constitutes a political majority and has acted in denying the fundamental rights and legitimate aspirations of Tamils;

Noting the presidential election held in 2005 between the candidates who ran on the platform of negation of the accepted fundamental principles and the other who failed to implement the pledges made during the peace process and who campaigned on the basis of having engineered a division of the Tamil Nation, as a consequence of which the Tamils exercised their democratic right and boycotted the election;

Noting the victory of the candidate who espoused the Sinhala Buddhist hegemony and rejected any kind of power sharing outside the unitary framework;

Noting the present president of Sri Lanka’s duplicity, for while airing policies of peace to the international community, he has adopted policies moving towards a military solution on the other side by engaging in a shadow war using various paramilitary groups directed by the Sri Lankan army and its intelligence unit with a intention of weakening the Tamil Nation, in violation of Article 1.8 of the CFA;

Noting that these paramilitaries and the Sinhala armed forces are behind the killing of Tamil parliamentary leaders, intellectuals, journalists, students and innocent civilians and thereby have made the Tamil Homeland into a killing field;

Noting that the present GoSL is amassing troops in the Tamil Homeland and is rehearsing for a major war, placing embargoes on fuel and building materials, restricting the freedom of movement of the people and intensifying existing restrictions on fishing;

Noting the refusal to make travel arrangements as agreed in the CFA and the obstruction of the LTTE political cadres in the SLA-controlled territory in Tamil Homeland attacks on the LTTE front defence lines and the indiscriminate aerial bombing and shelling of civilian settlements;

Noting the rapidly detoriating situation while the Geneva talks were held to examine the proper implementation of the CFA and the agreement of the GoSL to disarm the paramilitaries and the halting of violence against Tamil civilians;

Noting the killing of 207 civilians and 20 LTTE members since the Geneva talks;

Noting the failure to comply with the most important agreement in the Geneva Talks to disarm the paramilitary groups and now the denial of their very existence despite confirmation by the international community, the SLMM and international media;

Noting the false propaganda by the GoSL that LTTE attacked a passenger ship carrying unarmed troops while the SLMM monitor was present on the ship, but in reality the LTTE while carrying on its naval exercises was attacked by four Dvora gunboats. LTTE retaliated in self-defence, resulting in the sinking of one Dvora boat without being aware of the presence of another SLMM member in one of the Dvora boats. Immediately upon receiving notification from the Kilinochi SLMM office of the presence of an SLMM member in one of the Dora boats, LTTE ceased retaliation and allowed the Dvora boats to leave the area; the LTTE neither intended to attack the ship carrying the troops nor to endanger the lives of SLMM members;

Noting the existence of Sea Tigers, which was acknowledged by the SLMM as the LTTE’s de facto naval force on April 24, 2003;

Noting that in the CFA the LTTE and the GoSL are treated in an identical fashion with equal rights and responsibilities consistent with the overall principle of parity, reflecting a common guiding principle in the foundation of many other ceasefire agreements;

Noting that the GoSL’s armed forces should not and cannot be allowed to realize military objectives that they were unable to achieve during times of war;

Noting that based on law and fact, sovereignty over and under the sea appurtenant to the northeast and over the air belongs to the people of the northeast;

Noting the creation of a situation obstructing the LTTE’s Eastern Commanders meeting in the Vanni to decide on important matters pertaining to Geneva–II, and thereby derailing it;

Noting that while unleashing violence and creating an atmosphere of war, the GoSL placed the entire blame on the LTTE as war mongers and terrorists and continued the GoSL’s long-standing foreign policy of isolating them within the international community;

Noting that the European Union, accepting this false propaganda, punished the victims of state terror and branded the LTTE as a “terrorist organisation” without considering the realities of the ground situation;

Noting that the LTTE has always accepted the nomination of SLMM monitors by the Royal Norwegian Government;

Noting that the European Union’s recent actions taken with respect to the LTTE have regrettably created serious apprehension regarding the impartiality, or at least a perception of the lack of impartiality, of the representatives from those countries that are members of the EU: “Justice must not only be done but also seem to be done;”

Noting that the CFA need not be amended to address the LTTE’s concerns;

Noting that the LTTE accepted the Royal Norwegian Government’s invitation and came to Oslo in good faith to discuss ways and means to ensure the safety and security of the SLMM monitors;

Noting that the team sent by the GoSL to Oslo was described by the GoSL itself as “third-level”;

Noting that the SLMM’s monitors’ safety and the LTTE’s concerns could be met without amending the CFA coupled with the proper protocol of the level of the negotiating teams, the LTTE’s proposed bilateral talks with the SLMM and the facilitators in Oslo;

Noting that when the GoSL opposed the modalities of talks suggested by the LTTE, the LTTE proposed negotiations between the secretary general of the LTTE’s Peace Secretariat and his counterpart of similar status, following the proper protocol for negotiations;

Noting that the talks agreed on in Oslo are not to be Geneva Talks II, which require a prior meeting of the central committee of the LTTE and compliance with the Geneva I agreements; these prerequisites have not been satisfied due to the continued intransigence of the GoSL;

Noting that the international community’s insistence that the solution should be found within a united Sri Lanka coupled with the military threat against the LTTE will not only disrupt the power equilibrium but also remove the incentive for the GoSL to seek a negotiated settlement;

Noting that the International Community’s recent misguided attempt to differentiate the Tamil Nation from the LTTE, the sole interlocutor of the former in the negotiations, is injurious to the peace process;

Noting that Sri Lanka has achieved the status of being 25th in the index of failed states, and is demonstrating its lack of will and ability to enter into a just and equitable negotiated settlement;

Reaffirms its policy of finding a solution to the Tamil national question based on the realisation of its right to self-determination.

Source:

LTTE issues Communiqué in Oslo