ஒரு பத்திரம்

ஒக்ரோபர் 14, 2006

De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

Filed under: LTTE,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam,War of Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

Security Forces Commander, Jaffna peninsula, Major General Sarath Fonseka, outlined a plan to enable the resettlement of civilians (internally displaced persons) in High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna peninsula. He tabled these proposals in a letter sent to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on December 20, 2002. Primarily, he had called for disarming the LTTE to enable such re-settlement, and for maintaining a ‘balance of forces’ between the LTTE and government forces.

Presented below is the complete text of the proposals.

DE-ESCALATION PLAN

PREAMBLE

  1. GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and security forces appreciate the most important humanitarian need to resettle people back in the houses in areas affected by the war. In this sense expansion of HSZ [High Security Zone] from time to time has caused displacement of people in the Jaffna peninsula thus creating & humanitarian problem. Therefore GOSL and Security Forces has realized the need to expedite the resettling of displaced people and are keen to find a workable solution to solve this issue.
  2. It is also understood resettling civilians in HSZ can bring about a big political success to the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and any other interested parties. Therefore it can have a direct impact on political situation in Jaffna which may be most probably go in favour of LTTE under present political situation. While appreciating this situation it should also be born in mind that when talking in term of political situation, political criticism in the south of Sri Lanka also cannot be ignored. Therefore any adjustment or variations in Security Zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical.
  3. While appreciating the humanitarian achievements, consequences which will affect the Sri Lankan security forces and military gains the LTTE will achieve due to resettling civilian in HSZ should be also taken in to consideration. Therefore resettling civilians in the HSZ should go hand in glove with a de-escalation process agreed by both GOSL and LTTE. While appreciating the urgent need to resettle people in HSZ it is imperative that political mileage which the GOSL has to maintain through out the peace process should not be hindered by creating a weak security environment in the North.
  4. NEED FOR SECURITY

  5. As existence and strength of HSZ is utmost vital for success of defences’ and security of Jaffna peninsula and islands, no risks or chances should be taken, to weaken security by making HSZ vulnerable.
  6. As the present dimensions of HSZ are meant to face the present threat weakening HSZs should be done in relation to reduction of LTTE military options ranging from major conventional attacks to asymmetric attacks.
  7. Any normalizing plan which affects the sy [system] of HSZ should go hand in glove with reducing military options available to LTTE.
  8. Armed groups having the ability to get cover behind civilians should not be ignored and leave terrorist to take maximum advantage.
  9. Armed groups if mixed up with civilians to enter HSZ or get Int about HSZ will find it easier to launch physical attacks rather than firing long range wpns as presence of civilians in HSZ may hinder the freedom to fire long range wpns [weapons].

  10. Any armed groups attacking HSZ will want to physically capture or destroy command elements and resources within HSZ rather than trying attack to with long range weapons.
  11. If attacked from near benefited due to the increased ability to close in by mixing up with civilians while facing any attack from front, SF defences in HSZ will fall and face disastrous effects losing lot of life and resources.

  12. If the civilians are allowed to enter, threat on survivability of all HSZ are equally increased including the once facing uncleared areas.
  13. As peace or development will never come without security it is not advisable to weaken security of Jaffna peninsula and also aim at peace and development.
  14. As SF presently does not have 100 % superiority over the LTTE military capability, it is not advisable to take risks unless SF capabilities are developed to be able to remain 100 % superiority over LTTE thus any short term drawbacks can be overcome and regain initiative to avoid disasters

  15. If there is a threat for HSZ from immediate front/close proximity, rear or within due to resettling in HSZ to cater for such a situations, additional troops deployments will be required.
  16. FACTORS AFFECTING RESETTLEMENT

  17. Humanitarian Requirement. Resettlement in HSZ deserves serious concern as per the Humanitarian angle and the whole issue should be seen from following perspectives.

  1. There are about 10000 houses affected due to existence of HSZ.
  2. Due to prolonged displacement education of Jaffna students have been hampered.
  3. Due to displacement cultural values and tradition are been disturbed.
  4. Due to displacement civilian have become more vulnerable to the activities undemocratic forces.
  5. Displaced people have been socially handicapped and virtually face discrimination.
  6. Displaced people will be deprived of the service and infrastructure facilities afforded to normal civilians.
  7. Having displaced people will have a direct adverse impact on the economy of the region.

  1. Political agenda of the government. As the government is committed to the peace process to bring about lasting peace for Sri Lanka it is of paramount importance for the government to be concerned about the plight of the displaced people. Government should take all possible measures in this regard without disturbing the security requirements in order to retain its initiative to achieve long term success. Fol [following] areas should be included in the political agenda of the GOSL.

  1. Take sufficient interest on resettlement followed up with rehabilitation.
  2. Request for foreign donor assistance for development of affected areas and people.
  3. Take necessary steps to win hearts and minds of people affected.
  4. Mobilize all government ministries and departments etc for the purpose of successful resettlement of people by solving infrastructure facility problems.
  5. Provide an environment which encourages and assist in practicing democratic politics.

  1. Security. This is given the highest consideration as resettlements are going to take place within the areas declared as HSZs where most of the key installations are situated. Following factors needs to be given due consideration in order to ensure security is not compromised.

  1. Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in a such a way that SF should not compromise its security at any stage.
  2. Security can be relaxed only in stages in relation to de-escalation of LTTE. ie disarming of cadres and decommission of LTTE long range weapons.
  3. Effective and accurate system of activities has to be planned out for both LTTE and GOSL in coordination with SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] to ensure security will not be hampered and because of the resettlement of troops the defence layout should not be exposed to the civilians.
  4. Security of command and logistic elements to be ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive defenses, air and sea communication agencies should not be sacrificed.
  5. Security of IDP [Internally Displaced persons] also to be considered as equally important because, they may be vulnerable to terr [terrorist] activities, mines/IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] which are available in HSZs.
  6. Govt [Government] infrastructure-facilities transport agencies are vulnerable.
  7. Security of law enforcement agencies had to be considered for smooth functioning of the govt authority.

  1. Infrastructure Facilities. It is important that following facilities are required to be provided before the resettlement proper takes place in the HSZs.

  1. Electricity
  2. Transport
  3. Housing
  4. Medical
  5. Repairs to the road network
  6. Communication systems
  7. Education

  1. Finance and rehabilitation. This requirement will go hand in glove as civilians will require financial assistance to reconstruct their dwellings and also arrangements to be made regarding dry rations. Financial assistance will also be required to develop infrastructure facilities to readjust SF deployment. Assistance may be sought from NGOs.
  2. SLMM representatives. It is required to make an understanding between the SLA [Sri Lanka Army] and LITE in many areas. Following requirements to be looked into.

  1. Expansion of the monitoring mission by additional numbers.
  2. Enhance the mandate to cover more security issues.
  3. Since the LTTE is indirectly interfering with the deployment of security forces, SLMM assistance is required to minimize the security threat. For this purpose SLMM mandate should be amended to give more authority/power.

  1. Neutral body to supervise de-escalation. It is essential to have a neutral organization with sufficient number of staff to make a formidable force to monitor the implementation of the de-escalation process. This neutral body should be in a position to act as mediators with the respective theatres during the implementation of the de-escalation process. This body should work in liaison with the govt, Norwegian facilitators and LTTE regarding the progress of the implementation of de-escalation. SLMM may perform this task better.
  2. DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs

  3. De-escalation proposals in relation to resettlement in HSZs are given at annex ‘A’.
  4. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

  5. Implementation plans for resettlement has to be worked out in relation to de-escalation proposals given in this proposal under following headings. It is also required to come to an agreement by the govt with the LTTE under SLMM supervision to work out the implementation.

  1. Areas to be resettled including boundaries to be identified.
  2. Clearing of mines.
  3. Demarcation of prohibited areas/No Go areas.
  4. Enumerate the legitimate ownership.
  5. Financial support and rehabilitation.
  6. Providing infrastructure facilities.
  7. Essential services.
  8. Working out of a detail security system which will be revised from time to time as per deployments oh ground.
  9. Action plan for de-escalation in relation to resettlement.

  1. Following hotels and houses can be vacated for intended use/resettlement as early as possible as follows.

  1. Subash Hotel – By Mid June 2003.
  2. Gnanam Hotel – By End March 2003.
  3. Houses around above two hotels in Jaffna Town – About 80 in numbers – By Mid July 2003
  4. Private houses in Chavakachcheri – By End 2003.*
  5. Private houses in other areas – By Mid 2004.*

* Above ‘d’ and ‘e’ would facilitate handing over of houses occupied by the Security Forces on a continuing basis, as and when alternative accommodation is constructed.

  1. As recommended by the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation on 14 December 2002, it is expected financial requirements are provided by the government to SLA, commencing mid January 2003. Further, as stated in Oslo during the last negotiations, the SLA does not anticipate any objections from the LTTE on new relocation sites, as such responses would cause further delay.
  2. Following areas can be considered for early resettlement provided De-escalation proposals have been finalized and agreed as per the security requirements stated in the annex ‘A’.

  1. Area west of Keerimalai. (Annex A)
  2. Kovilakkandy. (Annex B)

  1. This report/proposals will have to be studied and approved by the higher authorities.

Date: 20 December 2002

GSC FONSEKA RWP RSP rcds psc
Major General
Commander
Security Forces (Jaffna)

Copies:
Secretary of Defence
Comd of the Army
Comd of the Navy
Comd of the Air Force


ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs
SECURITY THREAT UNDER PRESENT SITUATION – OUT SIDE HSZs

SRL NO

HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS

IDENTIFIED THREATS

RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS

REMARKS

1

Resettling of displaced persons to be carried out only for those families lived in the area before 1991 in Palaly HSZ and before 1995 in Nagarkovil, Muhamalai Thanankilappu, Ariyalai and beach road Jaffna.

Resettlement of Armed groups aid sympathizers in close proximity to camps.

Possible only in selected areas.

Restriction on visitors into resettled areas is required.

2

Enforcing deterrent Police action against violence.

Provoke people against SF to discharge violence.

Restriction on unlawful assemblies

Explore legality of imposing restrictions over areas outside HSZ and within HSZ.

3

SLMM mandate to be enhanced to check suspected safe houses of armed groups org [organisations] in cleared areas and create a system to monitor availability/distribution of arms ammo [ammunition] found in uncleared areas too.

Availability of LTTE military hardware including missiles in the cleared areas and uncleared areas.

SLMM/neutral observers to guarantee the removal of the threat before resettlement.

4

Conducting of counter insurgency operations

Develop military capability in HSZ

No resettlement.

Nil

5

Declaration of permanently abandoning of suicide missions and remove of such personnels with assistance of Police/SLMM intentions are identified.

Suicide cadres threat on SF movements and VIPs/VVIPs.

Will differ resettlement

Detrimental effect on confidence buildings

6

SLMM to prevent terrorist taking control over selected areas and ensure safe passage of SF. Conduct sporadic checks of safe houses and offices by SLMM to monitor above.

Hinder the mobility of SF confined to a restricted area by armed groups activities.

Resettlement to commence if the threat is eliminated.

SLMM mandate to be enhanced

7

Take all measures to prevent armed groups achieving the capability mentioned in identified threat. SLMM to continue spot checks on SF request for arms and ammo. Withdraw of LTTE weapons in forward lines and dumping them in rear/storage south of Kilinochchi under SLMM supervision.

Create situation within cleared areas. Tie down available troops in the belly thus depriving assistance to FDLs.

No resettlement unless the preventive measures are successful.

Nil

8

Police to be geared to take actions against hostile elements.

Hostile behaviour of people IDPs not yet resettled.

Expedite the resettlement process/ relocate where resettlement not possible.

Requirement of housing projects.

9

Ensure present security systems are effectively practiced and SLMM to keep checks on fishermen and sea tigers going to sea from uncleared areas.

Fishermen resettled in coastal areas sympathetic to armed groups movements.

Resettlement must not hinder the defence potential.

More applicable to defences facing Lagoons.

10

SLMM to remove such facilities available with LTTE. Also decommissioning of indirect weapon systems to be arranged.

Capability of passing accurate information to bring down accurate indirect fire by the people resettled.

Restrict the area of resettlement as there should not be radio communication from close proximity of HSZs.

Amend SLMM mandate.


ANNEX B

SECURITY THREAT AFTER CIVILIANS ARE RESETTLED IN HSZS

SRL. NO.

HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS

IDENTIFIED THREATS

RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS

REMARKS

1

Authority to search houses and personnel on suspicion. Also to continue regular checks on entry/ exit points. LTTE will not be allowed to do politics in HSZ.

Military cadres with forge identities will enter HSZs.

Only the people provide their legitimate ownership before 1991/95. LTTE members will not be allowed to resettled.

Nil

2

People resettled will not be allowed to go into prohibited areas.

Ability to attack VPs, VIPs possible

Only in selected areas.

3

Depriving communication facilities and decommissioning of indirect weapons to be done under SLMM supervision.

Accurate indirect fire could be brought down.

-DO-

Relocation of IDPs in crown land elsewhere where required.

4

Declare prohibited areas and legitimate search and arrest within HSZ and also decommissioning of missiles to be done.

Threat on security of air crafts and ships from within HSZ.

-DO-

5

Access to be denied to prohibited areas for civilians.

Ability to identify voids of defences.

-DO-

6

LTTE stop recruiting, total disarming of cadres and hand over weapons to SLMM

Reduce overall operational efficiency by reducing log [logistic] elements in HSZs. Thereby causing reduction of troops in the peninsula.

Resettlement to start after implementation

7

Avoid resettling of civilians in places from where Air port/ Harbour can be threatened and conduct regular checks and searchers and necessary to find hidden weapons etc. declaration of non-execution of underwater / seaborne suicide mission is also needed.

There will be a threat on harbour/air port when civilians resettle close to those locations.

Impose time restrictions on Entry/Exit points. Movement restrictions to be imposed during night. No entry/exit for fishing in HSZs. Resettlement on the coastal belt only in selected areas.

Make necessary arrangements to acquire land to enhance security/ development of harbour /airport

8

Retain buffer zones as much as possible for the defences specially in HSZs.

Armed groups mixed up with civilians may launch attacks where SF will not have sufficient reaction time.

No go areas to be declared separate. Entry/Exit points for different blocks of resettlement and also road networks should be worked out for selected resettlement areas. Such terrorist intentions will totally terminate resettlement.

Additional defence measures to be arranged.

9

Ground of tactical importance should be held by SF and any indication of such threat will be considered very seriously and preventive, deterrent action be taken immediately.

Options open to prepare fortifications in Ground of Tactical importance or selected areas. Eg: Vasavilan, Kadduvan, Thelippala and Keerimalai.

No resettlement in such areas

Maintain military strong points in Grounds of Tactical importance

10

Ownership of houses of displaced personnel who left before 1991/95 will be seriously considered when resettling.

Resettlement of sympathizes with forged identities to assist terrorist in offensive ops [operations] against SF.

Only in selected areas

Psy [psychological] ops and civil affairs operations to take special care of these families

11

Maintain and increase intelligence/survailance and early warning facilities and conduct regular searches of suspicious elements to enhance security of command, fire control and logistic elements

Possible attacks in VHSZs to paralise comd and control system support and log elements thereby prevent efficient conduct and supporting of def ops on FDLs.

Strict security checks on the civilians including house searches as required

12

Reduction of LTTE cadres in areas opposite cleared areas. Weapons withdrawn to be kept under SLMM custody.

SF is forced to contract or vacate certain part of HSZs thereby weakening/reducing the present military superiority in JFN [Jaffna] hence the power projection of LTTE beyond that of SF.

Resettlement will continue parallel to disarming

SLMM mandate to be enhanced and numbers to be increased.

13

To retain necessary amount of depth for the defences at any cost.

If resettled in HSZs as forced the defences to contract, SF will be forced to sacrifice depth of defences.

Resettle in the areas excluding areas which provide the depth.

Can be considered once threat has been reduced/ decommission-ing of weapons had taken place.

14

LTTE to deescalate by disarming and to retain a balance of power parallel to reduction of SF positions.

If the conflict escalates unable to go back to the original positions to regain initiative after civilians have been resettled.

If the threat is eliminated resettlement is possible

15

Reduce LTTE offensive capability by disarming and decommissioning of indirect weapons.

Due to the presence of civilians secrecy of SF defences will be sacrificed thus making defences vulnerable to armed group attacks.

Resettlement programme to be parallel to elimination of threat

-DO-

Source:

De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

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ஒக்ரோபர் 13, 2006

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe’s Letter to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on FM Radio Transmission Facilities for the Use of LTTE Peace Secretariat

Filed under: LTTE,Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 2:14 பிப

In response to a letter by President Chandrika Kumaratunga seeking clarification on the government permitting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to import FM transmission equipment, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sent a letter on January 3, 2003. He wrote the LTTE has not imported VSAT equipment and the consignment was received by Norway, thoroughly checked and moved to Killinochchi under armed guard.

Presented below is the full text of letter

3rd January, 2003
Her Excellency Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka,
Presidential Secretariat,
Colombo 1.

Your Excellency,

FM Radio Transmission facilities for the use of the LTTE Peace Secretariat

I write with reference to your letter of December 30, 2002 on the above subject and the attached copy of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway.

I presume you would have had the opportunity to see the Government’s statement on this matter, which was published in the media on the 28th of December, 2002. In case you have not, I am attaching a copy of this document for your information.

Since the Government’s statement contains much of the information regarding the concerns you have expressed in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, I shall only briefly elaborate on issues, which may require further clarification. I note too that we will have the opportunity of discussing this matter fully shortly.

In your enumeration of what you call “the relevant facts regarding this incident”, in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, you have taken up four specific matters.

1. The import in the consignment of a VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) communication unit, which you say, even the Government of Sri Lanka does not possess.

2. The inclusion of a Radio Data System (RDS) capable of sending data from point to point.

3. The FM frequency range in the equipment imported by the LTTE, which appears to be wider than the frequencies allotted to other FM radio stations operating in Sri Lanka.

4. The consignment of radio broadcasting equipment to the Embassy of the Royal Norwegian Government in Sri Lanka, intended for the use of the LTTE which was received and cleared from the Port of Colombo without payment of customs duty.

Let me briefly recapitulate what has been more comprehensively explained in the Government’s statement.

On October 1, 2002 the Political Headquarters of the LTTE in Kilinochchi informed my Secretary that the LTTE were now engaging in a dissemination campaign about the peace process and that they had purchased a new FM radio transmitter which they would like to bring to the Wanni. They requested that the relevant authorities be informed to give customs clearance for the equipment and that it would be appreciated if they could receive the equipment without delay and on a tax-free basis.

The Government decision on this, in principle, was that FM transmitting facilities should be provided since dissemination of information regarding the peace process, particularly in the North and East was important. As regards the matter of duty free import, the LTTE were to be informed that this concession could not be granted as it was against Government policy to make any exceptions regarding customs duty and VAT.

Thereafter, the LTTE were informed that a formal application with prescribed information, regarding such matters as location of the station, expected area of coverage, the power for transmission, frequencies and other operational details, programme composition etc., should be sent into the Ministry of Mass Communication, so that the application could receive full consideration by the Ministry and the TRCSL, before arriving at a final decision.

In arriving at our decision in principle to consider the LTTE’s request, the following considerations were uppermost in mind:

* That even at present, the LTTE are operating an unauthorised radio transmission facility popularly known as the ‘Voice of the Tigers’ (VOT). This, Your Excellency, as you are well aware, has been in operation for several years and has been totally uncontrolled by any governmental authority;

* The request for a licence, for the first time in the history of the 20-year conflict in which the LTTE has been engaged in with the Government, indicated a welcome change of attitude. It signalled the LTTE’s acceptance and willingness to come within the ambit of Sri Lankan law and regulation. In fact the Government is pleased that through the grant of such a licence to the LTTE Peace Secretariat, radio transmissions by the LTTE are being brought, for the first time, under the laws of Sri Lanka.

The licence that was finally given by the Ministry of Mass Communication on November 11, 2002 in terms of Section 44 of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Act No. 37 of 1966 subjects the holder of the licence, (that is the LTTE Peace Secretariat) to specific conditions regarding the content and manner of their future broadcasting.

The LTTE having a legal radio channel has to be placed in the context of the positive developments towards a permanent peace in Sri Lanka. You, yourself have referred at the commencement of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway the efforts made during your period of nearly 3 years to enter into direct negotiations with the LTTE.

Finally, and no doubt assisted by the foundation that you laid, it was possible for the Government through the signing of the MoU with the LTTE on 22nd February, 2002 to give practical effect to the commencement of the transformation of the LTTE from being, as you have said “one of the world’s most ruthless and murderous organisations” into a political grouping within the mainstream of the Sri Lankan political system.

I believe this profound paradigm shift, which is now in effect, has been favourably recognised and commented on publicly by the international community as well. Making available community radio broadcasting facilities, under regulation by the Government was seen as one way of encouraging forward movement in this positive direction.

Let me now deal with your concerns.

1. VSAT Communication Unit – Although one unit of VSAT communication equipment of value US Dollars 25,000 was listed in the list of items to be imported by the LTTE, and although the Government statement of 28th December presumed that it had been brought in with the FM radio equipment consignment, I am now informed both by the customs and the LTTE Peace Secretariat, that this unit (for which clearance had been approved by the TRCSL) was NOT shipped from Singapore and has NOT in fact been brought into the country.

Since your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway says that even the Government of Sri Lanka does not have such equipment, let me inform you that the SLT certainly does have VSAT communication facilities. In addition there are apparently 16 other authorised VSAT operators in the country in addition to several unauthorised ones.

Even some foreign correspondents are known to be using VSAT communication units for filing their reports overseas, up-linking to the satellite without going through the SLT international switch. You may recall that as far back as 1996 a facility based data communication system was given to the Ceycom Global Communication Ltd., which has now some 42 VSAT earth terminals in their system.

In this regard you might remember that the National Communication Policy which was approved by the Cabinet on the 13th of November, 2002 refers to the liberalisation of VSAT transmissions in the future in view of the well known fact that information communication technology has been very rapidly evolving across the world.

This will mean that in future any person could import VSAT equipment with the approval of the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (TRC). The up-linking frequency would of course need to be assigned by the TRC.

So in the light of what has been happening here and elsewhere your agitation in regard to VSAT equipment is unclear. Also you will undoubtedly be greatly relieved to know that the VSAT equipment has not been imported.

2. Radio Data System (audio)

The other question you have raised is that of the Radio Data System (RDS). This as Your Excellency may know is an essential part of a FM radio station and all private FM radio stations in Sri Lanka have this equipment. This cannot emit any radio frequency. The value of this equipment was only US Dollars 800.

3. FM frequency range

With reference to the FM frequency range, which you have also found suspicious, the explanation I believe is also quite simple. Different manufacturers evidently have different frequency bands in the FM radio system.

The English may manufacture within a certain frequency band and the US manufacturers in another. What is important is the spot frequency that is allocated by the TRCSL. In this case it is 98 Mhz which no existing operator has been assigned. The Regulatory Authority has the powers to monitor the frequency and the radiated power.

4. The role of the Norwegian Embassy

The major concern that you have referred in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway is that of the involvement of the Norwegian Embassy in assisting in the importation of the radio transmission equipment.

My observation on this is as follows:

The Government had decided that the acquisition of a FM radio transmission facility would enhance the peace process.

With the intention of assisting in this endeavour, the Government sought to utilise the good offices of the Royal Norwegian government which had done so much to facilitate the peace process to assist in the clearance of the equipment through the Customs. One of the reasons for obtaining the assistance of Norway was that as the facilitator, if the consignment was found to contain anything other than what was intended, that is, radio transmission equipment, the Government was going to disallow import and send the consignment back.

It was in these circumstances that the Norwegian Embassy acted as the consignee with the objective of transmitting the security cleared consignment to the SCOPP (the Peace Secretariat), which would in turn transmit it to the LTTE Peace Secretariat.

However even before this clearance was done, the Government took the step of ensuring that the items would be subject to the strictest check. A 4-member expert team consisting of senior officials of the Rupavahini Corporation, Sri Lanka Air Force, Sri Lanka Army and the Ministry of Mass Communications thereupon went to the Customs warehouse and after opening the packages examined all the equipment.

They confirmed that the equipment was such that was needed for FM radio transmissions and also made some technical observations. These have been conveyed to the LTTE Peace Secretariat for compliance. It was this team, which confirmed that the VSAT equipment was not among the list of items which were imported.

You will appreciate that the FM radio transmission equipment after checking was sealed and finally sent to the LTTE Peace Secretariat under armed guard.

This was done to prevent any other material being introduced into the packages or any items being removed.

The question that awaits settlement is that of the duty payable since, after import by the Embassy the goods were passed on to SCOPP, in the first instance and SCOPP is an agency of the Government.

The Minister of Finance will determine in the next few days the manner in which the issue of duty payable will be resolved. While endorsing your assertion that the Norwegian Government and its Embassy here have been always fully supportive of our efforts to consolidate the peace process, I must urge a note of caution in your intended intervention with the Prime Minister of Norway.

The Norwegian peace support team of Deputy Minister Vidar Helgessen, Mr. Eric Solheim and H.E. Jon Westborg have, as you know, been extremely active in facilitating the peace process. H.E. Jon Westborg, the Norwegian Ambassador has been in service here for almost six years and has an unrivalled experience of the ground realities in Sri Lanka.

It is known that the credentials of his successor have been handed over to the Foreign Ministry in mid-November and that on completion of his assignment in Colombo he will be shortly returning to Norway.

Undoubtedly the Government of Norway will continue to utilise his expertise. I think therefore that as a Government we should exercise due care, at this critical stage in the peace process, to ensure that the enthusiasm of the Norwegian facilitation and the momentum thus far generated continues undiminished. I trust the above clarifies some of the concerns you have raised.

I look forward to our further discussion at an early meeting. Since you have released copies of your letters to the media, I am doing so myself since the public need to be kept fully informed.

Yours sincerely,

Ranil Wickremesinghe,
Prime Minister.

செப்ரெம்பர் 26, 2006

SLMC Proposals for North East Interim Council

Filed under: LTTE,Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப

Late SLMC leader and Ports Minister M.H.M. Ashraff, before his death in an aircrash on September 16, had proposed the following items to enable the security and safeguards of the minorities in the the North East when the Interim Regional Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces are established under the proposed New Constitution. These proposals assume importance in view of the Presidential assertion to introduce the Constitutional Reforms Bill after the parliamentary elections.

Powers

The Interim Council shall exercise its powers with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for equality of civil, political social, religious and cultural rights of freedom from discrimination for all citizens and to parity of esteem and just and equal treatment for their identity, ethos and aspirations of all communities.

Membership

I. Members of the Interim Council shall be appointed by the President upon being nominated by registered political parties or independent groups representing the citizens of the Northern and Eastern regions. However, the President shall ensure that the ethnic composition of the Northern and Eastern Regions is reflected in the membership of the Interim Council.

II. The governor shall also appoint another minister from the largest minority community on the advice of the Chief Minister.

III. A member nominated by a political party shall be liable to be removed at the instance of that party or independent group.

IV. The President shall fill the vacancy created by the removal with another nominee from the same political party or independent group.

Board of Ministers

I. The Board of Ministers shall consist of the Chief Minister, two Deputy Chief Ministers and six other ministers. The Governor shall appoint as Chief Minister the member of the council who is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of this council.

II. The Governor shall appoint the two Deputy Chief Ministers and they shall be from communities other than the community to which the chief minister belongs. The deputy chief ministers shall be the persons who are best able to command the support of the majority of the members of their respective communities.

Executive Committee System

The provisions of Chapter XV relating to executive committee will apply to the interim council.

Constitutional assignment of ministerial subjects and functions

The core subjects and functions to be assigned to the chief minister, the two deputy chief ministers and the other ministers should be enshrined in the new constitution.

Parallel Consent

The following decisions of the council shall require parallel consent i.e. a majority of those members present and voting and including a majority among each of the communities represented in the interim council i.e. Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities.

a. Election of the Speaker

b. adoption of standing orders

c. Any other vital decisions pertaining to the security, religion, etc. of the communities of the region that shall be declared by the Speaker as a decision requiring parallel consent upon a motion to that effect being supported by not less than 30 per centum of the total number of members.

Representation at the chief ministers Conference

The two deputy chief ministers shall be entitled to participate in the chief ministers conference.

Budget Allocations

The Finance Commission shall take into consideration the following matters before allocating funds and give appropriate directives to the Interim Council.

I. The disparity already prevailing in certain under developed local authority areas.

II. The size of the population and geographic size of the area of the local authority.

III. The Interim Council should expend such funds as are allocated to it by the central government in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Finance Commission.

IV. The Interim Council should also ensure areas where minority communities are concentrated within a particular local authority should not in any way be discriminated in the allocation of funds for development.

Law and Order

I. The Interim Council shall assist the government in the de-escalation of and de-commissioning of illegally held arms in the possessions of para military groups.

II. The chief minister shall take all decisions pertaining to the security of the minorities of the region in consultation with the respective Deputy Chief Ministers.

New Administrative Districts

There shall be established a new Administrative District for the coastal area of Digamadulla district consisting of Kalmunai, Samanthurai and Pottuvil areas.

Source:

SLMC Proposals for North East Interim Council

செப்ரெம்பர் 23, 2006

Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities 5 January 1995

Filed under: LTTE,Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப


தமிழில்

A seven point document was formulated during the second round of talks which took place on 2 January 1995. The Sri Lanka government delegation included a senior Sri Lanka Army Officer, Brigadier A.S.Pieris and a Sri Lanka naval officer, Captain Prasanna Rajaratne. The LTTE delegation was led by Mr. Tamilselvan, Head of the Political Wing. The Declaration of the cessation of hostilities was signed on 5 January 1995, simultaneously by Mr.Velupillai Pirabakaran, Leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in Jaffna, and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief, in Colombo – and the document was exchanged between them through the good offices of the International Red Cross Committee. The Cessation of Hostilities came into effect from 8 January 1995.

Text of Declaration

The modalities for the implementation of the agreed Cessation of Hostilities by the Government and LTTE for a specified period will be as follows:-

    1. There will be no offensive operations by either party during this period. An offensive operation will be considered a violation of the agreement.

    2. The Security Forces and the LTTE will maintain their present positions on the ground, keeping a minimum of 600 metres between each other. However, each party would reserve the right of movement within 100 metres from their own bunker lines, keeping a minimum of 400 metres in between. Any party moving in the restricted areas would be considered an offensive operation.

    3. The Navy and Airforce will continue to perform their legitimate tasks for safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, from external aggression, without in any way engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE, or causing any obstructions to legitimate and bona fide fishing activity in specified areas.

    4. Acts such as sabotage, bomb explosions, abductions, assassinations and intimidation directed at any political group, party or any individual will amount to an offensive operation.

    5.a. It is suggested that Committees to deal with violations of this agreement be set up to inquire into nay instances of violation of the above terms of agreement. These Committees could be set up in the areas of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa-Ampara and any other areas as deemed necessary

    b. It will be the responsibility of these Committees to take immediate action on complaints made by either party to this agreement to inquire into and resolve such disputes.

    c. These Committees could comprise representatives drawn from Canada, Netherlands, Norway, ICRC and from retired Judges or Public Officers, Religious Heads and other leading citizens: all appointed by mutual agreement.

    d. Each Committee could consist of five members, viz: 02 from Government, 02 from LTTE and, 01 from a Foreign Country who will be Chairman.

    e. Freedom of movement for the Committees to perform their tasks will have to be ensured by both parties to the agreement.

    f. Facilities required for the Committees to act swiftly and impartially will have to provided by mutual agreement.

    6. Recommend establishment of communication between Sri Lanka and LTTE military area leaders which will enable them to sort out problems expeditiously, locally.

    7. Cessation of hostilities will continue till notice of termination is given by either party. Such notice should be given at least 72 hours before termination.

Signed on 5 January 1995

V.Pirabakaran,
Leader, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Chandrika

Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

 

Source:

Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities 5 January 1995

செப்ரெம்பர் 22, 2006

LTTE’s proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority in the Northeast region of Sri Lanka

Filed under: Government of Tamil Eelam,LTTE,Politics,Sri Lanka,Tamil Eelam — CAPitalZ @ 9:00 முப


தமிழில்

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on November 1, 2003, submitted its proposals for an Interim Administration in the North East region to the Sri Lankan Government through the Norwegian facilitators. Following is the full text of the proposals:

THE PROPOSAL BY THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM ON BEHALF OF THE TAMIL PEOPLE FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY FOR THE NORTHEAST OF THE ISLAND OF SRI LANKA

Consistent with the principles of the rule of law, the human rights and equality of all persons, and the right to self-determination of Peoples,

Determined to bring lasting peace to all persons of the island of Sri Lanka,

Acknowledging with appreciation the services of the Royal Norwegian Government, the Norwegian People, and the international community in attempting to bring peace to the island,

Recognizing that a peaceful resolution is a real possibility, despite the challenging history of the peace process between the Tamil people and the Sinhala people.

Determined to establish an interim self-governing authority for the NorthEast region and to provide for the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast by formulating laws and policies and, effectively and expeditiously executing all resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction,

and development in the NorthEast, while the process for reaching a final settlement remains ongoing.

Being aware that the history of the relations between the Tamil People and the Sinhala People has been a process of broken promises and unilateral abrogation, by successive governments of Sri Lanka, of pacts and agreements solemnly entered into between the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the elected representatives of the Tamil People,

Bcaring in mind that successive Governments of Sri Lanka have perpetrated persecution, discrimination, State violence and State-orchestrated violence against the Tamil People,

Noting that the Tamil people mandated their elected representatives to establish an independent sovereign, secular State for the Tamil people in the elections subsequent to the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976,

Bcaring in mind that the Tamil armed struggle as a measure of self-defense and as a means

for the realisation of the Tamil rights to self-determination arose only after more than four decades of non-violent and peaceful constitutional struggle proved to be futile and due to the absence of means to resolve the conflict peacefully,

Recalling that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) first took measures towards peace by unilaterally declaring the ceasefire in December, 2000 and again in December, 2001, opening highways, facilitating trade and the free movement of people, and entering into peace negotiations in good faith in the hope of creating an environment conducive to the return of ‘normalcy and a just resolution of the conflict,

Taking Note of the political courage of the present GOSL in reciprocating to the 200 I cease fire,

Realizing that the war in the island of Sri Lanka was principally confined to the NorthEast, resulting in the destruction of the social, economic, administrative, and physical infrastructure of that area, and that the NorthEast still remains the region in the island of Sri Lanka affected by war,

Recognising that the majority of the Tamil People in the NorthEast. by their actions in the general elections held in the year 2000, gave their mandate acknowledging the L TTE as their authentic representative,

Knowing that the LTTE exercises effective control and jurisdiction over the majority of the NorthEast area of the island of Sri Lanka.

Realising that reaching a final negotiated settlement and the implementation thereof is expected to be a long process,

Affirming the necessity for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and their urgent need for unimpeded access to their homes and secure livelihoods at land and sea in the NorthEast,

Mindful that institutions and services provided by the GOSL have proved to be inadequate to meet the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast.

Recognising the failure of the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) and other Sub-Committees formed during the peace negotiations, which failure was due to the composition of such Sub-Committees which repeatedly led to inaction,

Acknowledging the recognition by the GOSL of the necessity for an Interim Authority, as mentioned in its 2000 election manifesto,

Realising the maintenance of law and order is an essential pre-requisite for a just and free society,

Recognising the need for raising revenue to meet the urgent needs for the Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development of the NorthEast region, which has been devastated by war, and for the carrying out of any function of Government,

Recognising the importance of control over land in resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development,

Mindful that the Tamils did not participate in the making of the 1972 and 1978 constitutions, which institutionalized discrimination and denied them an effective role in the decision-making process,

Noting the practice in international relations over the last decade of solving conflicts between Peoples through agreement between the parties to the conflict on terms of equality and through innovative and imaginative measures,

Relying on international precedents for establishing interim governing arrangements in war-torn countries having the force of law based solely on pacts or agreements between the warring parties recognized by the international community,

Noting that measures such as the Cease fire Agreement, including the role of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and, the establishment of the SIHRN and the NorthEast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) constitute valid precedents for making such arrangements,

Wherefore, the Parties, namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka, hereby agree to the following provisions:

1. Interim Self-Governing Authority

An Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) shall be established comprised of the eight districts namely: Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Vavuniya in the NorthEast, until a final negotiated settlement is reached and implemented.

Representatives of the Muslim community have the right to participate in formulation of their role in the ISGA.

2. Composition of the ISGA

2 l. The I SGA shall consist of such number of members as may be determined by the Parties to this Agreement.

2.2. The composition of the ISGA shall be:

2.2.a. Members appointed by the LTTE,

2.2.b. Members appointed by the GOSL, and

2.2.c. Members appointed by the Muslim community in the NorthEast.

2.3. The number of members will be determined to ensure:

2.3.a. An absolute majority of the LTTE appointees in the ISGA.

2.3.b. Subject to (a) above, the Muslim and Sinhala Communities in the NorthEast shall have representation in the ISGA.

2.4. The Chairperson shall be elected by a majority vote of the ISGA and shal1 serve as the Chief Executive of the ISGA.

2.5. The Chairperson shall appoint the Chief Administrator for the NorthEast and such other officers as may be required to assist in tbe performance of his/her duties. The Chairperson shall have the powers to suspend or terminate any such appointment.

 

3. Elections

The provisions of Clauses 2.2 and 2.3 shall continue until elections for the ISGA are held. Such elections shall be held at the expiry of five years of the coming into force of this Agreement, if no final settlement has been reached and implemented by the end of the said period of five years. An independent Election Commission, appointed by the ISGA, shall conduct free and fair elections in accordance with international democratic principles and standards under international observation.

4. Human Rights

The people of the NorthEast shall be accorded all rights as are provided under international human rights law. Ever) law, regulation, rule, order or decision of the ISGA shal1 conform to internationally accepted standards of human rights protection. There shall be an independent Human Rights Commission, appointed by the ISGA, which shall ensure the compliance with all such human rights obligations. The Commission will seek the assistance of international human rights bodies to facilitate the rapid establishment of an effective regime for protecting human rights. The Commission shall be entitled to receive petitions from any individual person, award compensation to any such affected person, and ensure that such person’s rights are restored.

5. Secularism

No religion shall be given the foremost place in the NorthEast.

6. Prohibition against Discrimination

The ISGA shall ensure that there is no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, national or regional origin, age or gender in the NorthEast.

7. Prevention of Bribery and Corruption.

The ISGA shall ensure that no bribery or corruption is permitted in or under its administration.

8. Protection of All Communities

No law, regulation, rule, order or decision that confers a privilege or imposes a disability on any community, which is not conferred or imposed on any other community, shall be made concerning culture or religion.

9. Jurisdiction of the ISGA.

9.1. The ISGA shall have plenary power for the governance of the NorthEast including powers in relation to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development, including improvement and upgrading of existing services and facilities (hereinafter referred to as RRRD), raising revenue including imposition of taxes, revenue, levies and duties, law and order, and over land.

These powers shall include all powers and functions in relation to regional administration exercised by the GOSL in and for the NorthEast.

9.2. The detailed modalities for the exercise of such powers and the performance of such functions shall be subject to further discussion by the parties to this agreement

10. Separation of Powers

Separate institutions for the administration of justice shall be established for the NorthEast, and judicial powers shall be vested in such institutions. The ISGA shall take appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the judges.

Subject to Clauses 4 (Human Rights) and 22 (Settlement of Disputes), of this Agreement, the institutions created under this clause shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of this agreement and any other disputes arising in or under this agreement or any provision thereof.

11. Finance

The ISGA shall prepare an annual budget.

There shall be a Financial Commission consisting of members appointed by the ISGA. The members should have distinguished themselves or held high office in the fields of finance, administration or business. This Commission shall make recommendations as to the amount out of the Consolidated Fund to be allocated to the NorthEast. The GOSL shall make its good faith efforts to implement the recommendation.

The ISGA will, giving due consideration to an equitable distribution, determine the use of funds placed at its disposal. These funds shall include the NorthEast General Fund, the NorthEast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) and the Special Fund.

The GOSL agrees that any and all of its expenditures in or for the NorthEast shall be subject to the control of the ISGA.

11.1. NorthEast General Fund

The NorthEast General Fund shall be under the control of ISGA and shall consist of:

II.I.a. The proceeds of all grants and loans made by the GOSL to the ISGA and the proceeds of all other loans made to the ISGA.

ll.l.b. All allocations by the GOSL from agreements with states, institutions and/or other organizations earmarked in any such agreements for the NorthEast.

11 .1.c. All other receipts of the ISGA, other than the funds specified below.

 

11.2. NorthEast Reconstruction Fund

The NERF shall continue to exist in its present form except that control over it will be transferred to the

ISGA.

All grants given for the reconstruction of the NorthEast, will be received through the NERF. Utilization of resources from NERF will be directly determined and supervised by the ISGA.

11.3. Special Fund

All loans and any grants which cannot be channeled through the NERF for the specific purpose of RRRD will be received into the Special Fund. As in the case of other Funds, the ISGA shall control the Special Fund.

] 2. Powers to Borrow, Receive Aid and Trade.

The ISGA shall have powers to borrow internally and externally, provide guarantees and indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in or regulate internal and external trade.

13. Accounting and Auditing of Funds.

13.1. The ISGA shall appoint an Auditor General.

13.2. All Funds referred to in this Agreement shall be operated, maintained and audited in accordance with internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards. The accounts will be audited by the Auditor General. The auditing of all moneys received from international sources shall be subjected to approval by an internationally-reputed firm appointed by the ISGA.

14. District Committees.

14.1. In the effective exercise of its legislative and executive powers, the ISGA may create District Committees to carry out administration in the districts and delegate to such Committees, such powers as the ISGA may determine. The Chairpersons of such committees shall be appointed by the ISGA from amongst its members in order to serve as a liaison between the ISGA and the Committees.

14.2. The other members of the Committees shall also be appointed by the ISGA, which shall have the powers to suspend or terminate any such appointment. In appointing such members, due consideration shall be given to ensure representation of all communities.

14.3. The Committees will function directly under the ISGA.

14.4. The Chief Administrator of the ISGA shall appoint Principal Executive Officers in the districts, who shall also function as the Secretaries to the Committees. The Chief Administrator shall have the powers to suspend or terminate any such appointment.

 

14.5. All activities and functions of the Committees shall be coordinated through the respective Secretaries to the Committees.

14.6. Sub-committees may also be appointed to facilitate administration.

15. Administration

As part of the exercise of its executive powers the ISGA shall have direction and control over any and all administrative structures and personnel in the NorthEast pertaining to the powers set out in Clause 9 of this Agreement.

The ISGA may, at its discretion, create expert advisory committees in necessary areas. These areas will include but are not limited to Economic Affairs, Financial Affairs, Judicial Affairs, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Affairs, Development of Infrastructure, and Essential Services.

16. Administration of Land

Since land is vital to the exercise of the powers set out in Clause 9 (jurisdiction of the ISGA), the ISGA shall have the power to alienate and determine the appropriate use of all land in the NorthEast that is not privately owned.

The ISGA shall appoint a Special Commission on Administration of Land to inquire into and reprt on the rights of dispossessed people over land and land subject to encroachment, notwithstanding the lapse of any time relating to prescription.

The ISGA shall determine the term of competencies of the Special Commission.

17. Resettlement of Occupied Lands

The occupation of land by the armed forces of the GOSL, and the denial to the rightful civilian owners of unfettered access to such land, is a violation of the norms of international law. Such land must be immediately vacated and restored to the possession of the previous owners. The GOSL must also compensate the owners for the past dispossession of their land.

The ISGA shall be responsible for the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced civilians and refugees in such lands.

18. Marine and off-shore resources

The ISGA shall have control over the marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and the power to regulate access thereto.

 

19. Natural Resources

The ISGA will have control over the natural resources in the NorthEast region. Existing agreements relating to any such natural resources will continue in force. The GOSL shall ensure that all monies due under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Any future changes to such existing agreements should be made with the concurrence of the ISGA. Future agreements shall be entered into with the ISGA.

20. Water Use

Upper riparian users of river systems have a duty to ensure that there is a fair, equitable and reasonable use of water resources by lower riparian users. The GOSL and the ISGA shall ensure that this internationally recognized principle is followed in the use of water resources.

21. Agreements and contracts

All future agreements concerning matters under the jurisdiction of the ISGA shall be made with the ISGA. Existing agreements will continue, but the GOSL shall ensure that all proceeds under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Any changes to such existing agreements should be made with the concurrence of the ISGA.

22. Settlement of Disputes

Where a dispute arises between the Parties to this Agreement as to its interpretation or implementation, and it cannot be resolved by any other means acceptable to the Parties including conciliation by the Royal Norwegian Government, there shall be an arbitration before a tribunal consisting of three members, two of whom shall be appointed by each Party. The third member, who shall be the Chairperson of the tribunal, shall be appointed jointly by the Parties concerned. In the event of any disagreement over the appointment of the Chairperson, the Parties shall ask the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the Chairperson.

In the determination of any dispute the arbitrators shall ensure the parity of status of the L TTE and the GOSL and shall resolve disputes by reference only to the provisions of this Agreement.

The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and conclusive and it shall be binding on the Parties to the dispute.

23. Operational Period

This Agreement shall continue until a new Government for the NorthEast, pursuant to a permanent negotiated settlement, is established. The Parties will negotiate in good faith to reach such a settlement as early as possible.

Provided, however, that at the end of four years if no final agreement has been reached between the Parties to this agreement, both Parties shall engage in negotiations in good faith for the purpose of adding, clarifying, and strengthening the terms of this Agreement.

 

Source:

LTTE’s proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority in the Northeast region of Sri Lanka

THE PROPOSAL BY THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM oN BEHALF OF THE TAMIL PEOPLE FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY FOR THE NORTHEAST OF THE ISLAND OF SRI LANKA

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