De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

Security Forces Commander, Jaffna peninsula, Major General Sarath Fonseka, outlined a plan to enable the resettlement of civilians (internally displaced persons) in High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna peninsula. He tabled these proposals in a letter sent to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on December 20, 2002. Primarily, he had called for disarming the LTTE to enable such re-settlement, and for maintaining a ‘balance of forces’ between the LTTE and government forces. Presented below is the complete text of the proposals.

DE-ESCALATION PLAN

PREAMBLE

1. GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and security forces appreciate the most important humanitarian need to resettle people back in the houses in areas affected by the war. In this sense expansion of HSZ [High Security Zone] from time to time has caused displacement of people in the Jaffna peninsula thus creating & humanitarian problem. Therefore GOSL and Security Forces has realized the need to expedite the resettling of displaced people and are keen to find a workable solution to solve this issue.
2. It is also understood resettling civilians in HSZ can bring about a big political success to the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and any other interested parties. Therefore it can have a direct impact on political situation in Jaffna which may be most probably go in favour of LTTE under present political situation. While appreciating this situation it should also be born in mind that when talking in term of political situation, political criticism in the south of Sri Lanka also cannot be ignored. Therefore any adjustment or variations in Security Zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical.
3. While appreciating the humanitarian achievements, consequences which will affect the Sri Lankan security forces and military gains the LTTE will achieve due to resettling civilian in HSZ should be also taken in to consideration. Therefore resettling civilians in the HSZ should go hand in glove with a de-escalation process agreed by both GOSL and LTTE. While appreciating the urgent need to resettle people in HSZ it is imperative that political mileage which the GOSL has to maintain through out the peace process should not be hindered by creating a weak security environment in the North.

NEED FOR SECURITY

4. As existence and strength of HSZ is utmost vital for success of defences’ and security of Jaffna peninsula and islands, no risks or chances should be taken, to weaken security by making HSZ vulnerable.
5. As the present dimensions of HSZ are meant to face the present threat weakening HSZs should be done in relation to reduction of LTTE military options ranging from major conventional attacks to asymmetric attacks.
6. Any normalizing plan which affects the sy [system] of HSZ should go hand in glove with reducing military options available to LTTE.
7. Armed groups having the ability to get cover behind civilians should not be ignored and leave terrorist to take maximum advantage.
8. Armed groups if mixed up with civilians to enter HSZ or get Int about HSZ will find it easier to launch physical attacks rather than firing long range wpns as presence of civilians in HSZ may hinder the freedom to fire long range wpns [weapons].

9. Any armed groups attacking HSZ will want to physically capture or destroy command elements and resources within HSZ rather than trying attack to with long range weapons.
10. If attacked from near benefited due to the increased ability to close in by mixing up with civilians while facing any attack from front, SF defences in HSZ will fall and face disastrous effects losing lot of life and resources.

11. If the civilians are allowed to enter, threat on survivability of all HSZ are equally increased including the once facing uncleared areas.
12. As peace or development will never come without security it is not advisable to weaken security of Jaffna peninsula and also aim at peace and development.
13. As SF presently does not have 100 % superiority over the LTTE military capability, it is not advisable to take risks unless SF capabilities are developed to be able to remain 100 % superiority over LTTE thus any short term drawbacks can be overcome and regain initiative to avoid disasters

14. If there is a threat for HSZ from immediate front/close proximity, rear or within due to resettling in HSZ to cater for such a situations, additional troops deployments will be required.

FACTORS AFFECTING RESETTLEMENT

15. Humanitarian Requirement. Resettlement in HSZ deserves serious concern as per the Humanitarian angle and the whole issue should be seen from following perspectives.

1. There are about 10000 houses affected due to existence of HSZ.
2. Due to prolonged displacement education of Jaffna students have been hampered.
3. Due to displacement cultural values and tradition are been disturbed.
4. Due to displacement civilian have become more vulnerable to the activities undemocratic forces.
5. Displaced people have been socially handicapped and virtually face discrimination.
6. Displaced people will be deprived of the service and infrastructure facilities afforded to normal civilians.
7. Having displaced people will have a direct adverse impact on the economy of the region.

1. Political agenda of the government. As the government is committed to the peace process to bring about lasting peace for Sri Lanka it is of paramount importance for the government to be concerned about the plight of the displaced people. Government should take all possible measures in this regard without disturbing the security requirements in order to retain its initiative to achieve long term success. Fol [following] areas should be included in the political agenda of the GOSL.

1. Take sufficient interest on resettlement followed up with rehabilitation.
2. Request for foreign donor assistance for development of affected areas and people.
3. Take necessary steps to win hearts and minds of people affected.
4. Mobilize all government ministries and departments etc for the purpose of successful resettlement of people by solving infrastructure facility problems.
5. Provide an environment which encourages and assist in practicing democratic politics.

1. Security. This is given the highest consideration as resettlements are going to take place within the areas declared as HSZs where most of the key installations are situated. Following factors needs to be given due consideration in order to ensure security is not compromised.

1. Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in a such a way that SF should not compromise its security at any stage.
2. Security can be relaxed only in stages in relation to de-escalation of LTTE. ie disarming of cadres and decommission of LTTE long range weapons.
3. Effective and accurate system of activities has to be planned out for both LTTE and GOSL in coordination with SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] to ensure security will not be hampered and because of the resettlement of troops the defence layout should not be exposed to the civilians.
4. Security of command and logistic elements to be ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive defenses, air and sea communication agencies should not be sacrificed.
5. Security of IDP [Internally Displaced persons] also to be considered as equally important because, they may be vulnerable to terr [terrorist] activities, mines/IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] which are available in HSZs.
6. Govt [Government] infrastructure-facilities transport agencies are vulnerable.
7. Security of law enforcement agencies had to be considered for smooth functioning of the govt authority.

1. Infrastructure Facilities. It is important that following facilities are required to be provided before the resettlement proper takes place in the HSZs.

1. Electricity
2. Transport
3. Housing
4. Medical
5. Repairs to the road network
6. Communication systems
7. Education

1. Finance and rehabilitation. This requirement will go hand in glove as civilians will require financial assistance to reconstruct their dwellings and also arrangements to be made regarding dry rations. Financial assistance will also be required to develop infrastructure facilities to readjust SF deployment. Assistance may be sought from NGOs.
2. SLMM representatives. It is required to make an understanding between the SLA [Sri Lanka Army] and LITE in many areas. Following requirements to be looked into.

1. Expansion of the monitoring mission by additional numbers.
2. Enhance the mandate to cover more security issues.
3. Since the LTTE is indirectly interfering with the deployment of security forces, SLMM assistance is required to minimize the security threat. For this purpose SLMM mandate should be amended to give more authority/power.

1. Neutral body to supervise de-escalation. It is essential to have a neutral organization with sufficient number of staff to make a formidable force to monitor the implementation of the de-escalation process. This neutral body should be in a position to act as mediators with the respective theatres during the implementation of the de-escalation process. This body should work in liaison with the govt, Norwegian facilitators and LTTE regarding the progress of the implementation of de-escalation. SLMM may perform this task better.

DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs

2. De-escalation proposals in relation to resettlement in HSZs are given at annex ‘A’.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

3. Implementation plans for resettlement has to be worked out in relation to de-escalation proposals given in this proposal under following headings. It is also required to come to an agreement by the govt with the LTTE under SLMM supervision to work out the implementation.

1. Areas to be resettled including boundaries to be identified.
2. Clearing of mines.
3. Demarcation of prohibited areas/No Go areas.
4. Enumerate the legitimate ownership.
5. Financial support and rehabilitation.
6. Providing infrastructure facilities.
7. Essential services.
8. Working out of a detail security system which will be revised from time to time as per deployments oh ground.
9. Action plan for de-escalation in relation to resettlement.

1. Following hotels and houses can be vacated for intended use/resettlement as early as possible as follows.

1. Subash Hotel – By Mid June 2003.
2. Gnanam Hotel – By End March 2003.
3. Houses around above two hotels in Jaffna Town – About 80 in numbers – By Mid July 2003
4. Private houses in Chavakachcheri – By End 2003.*
5. Private houses in other areas – By Mid 2004.*

* Above ‘d’ and ‘e’ would facilitate handing over of houses occupied by the Security Forces on a continuing basis, as and when alternative accommodation is constructed.

1. As recommended by the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation on 14 December 2002, it is expected financial requirements are provided by the government to SLA, commencing mid January 2003. Further, as stated in Oslo during the last negotiations, the SLA does not anticipate any objections from the LTTE on new relocation sites, as such responses would cause further delay.
2. Following areas can be considered for early resettlement provided De-escalation proposals have been finalized and agreed as per the security requirements stated in the annex ‘A’.

1. Area west of Keerimalai. (Annex A)
2. Kovilakkandy. (Annex B)

1. This report/proposals will have to be studied and approved by the higher authorities.

Date: 20 December 2002

GSC FONSEKA RWP RSP rcds psc
Major General
Commander
Security Forces (Jaffna)

Copies:
Secretary of Defence
Comd of the Army
Comd of the Navy
Comd of the Air Force

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ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs
SECURITY THREAT UNDER PRESENT SITUATION – OUT SIDE HSZs

SRL NO	HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS	IDENTIFIED THREATS	RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS	REMARKS
1	Resettling of displaced persons to be carried out only for those families lived in the area before 1991 in Palaly HSZ and before 1995 in Nagarkovil, Muhamalai Thanankilappu, Ariyalai and beach road Jaffna.	Resettlement of Armed groups aid sympathizers in close proximity to camps.	Possible only in selected areas.	Restriction on visitors into resettled areas is required.
2	Enforcing deterrent Police action against violence.	Provoke people against SF to discharge violence.	Restriction on unlawful assemblies	Explore legality of imposing restrictions over areas outside HSZ and within HSZ.
3	SLMM mandate to be enhanced to check suspected safe houses of armed groups org [organisations] in cleared areas and create a system to monitor availability/distribution of arms ammo [ammunition] found in uncleared areas too.	Availability of LTTE military hardware including missiles in the cleared areas and uncleared areas.	SLMM/neutral observers to guarantee the removal of the threat before resettlement.
4	Conducting of counter insurgency operations	Develop military capability in HSZ	No resettlement.	Nil
5	Declaration of permanently abandoning of suicide missions and remove of such personnels with assistance of Police/SLMM intentions are identified.	Suicide cadres threat on SF movements and VIPs/VVIPs.	Will differ resettlement	Detrimental effect on confidence buildings
6	SLMM to prevent terrorist taking control over selected areas and ensure safe passage of SF. Conduct sporadic checks of safe houses and offices by SLMM to monitor above.	Hinder the mobility of SF confined to a restricted area by armed groups activities.	Resettlement to commence if the threat is eliminated.	SLMM mandate to be enhanced
7	Take all measures to prevent armed groups achieving the capability mentioned in identified threat. SLMM to continue spot checks on SF request for arms and ammo. Withdraw of LTTE weapons in forward lines and dumping them in rear/storage south of Kilinochchi under SLMM supervision.	Create situation within cleared areas. Tie down available troops in the belly thus depriving assistance to FDLs.	No resettlement unless the preventive measures are successful.	Nil
8	Police to be geared to take actions against hostile elements.	Hostile behaviour of people IDPs not yet resettled.	Expedite the resettlement process/ relocate where resettlement not possible.	Requirement of housing projects.
9	Ensure present security systems are effectively practiced and SLMM to keep checks on fishermen and sea tigers going to sea from uncleared areas.	Fishermen resettled in coastal areas sympathetic to armed groups movements.	Resettlement must not hinder the defence potential.	More applicable to defences facing Lagoons.
10	SLMM to remove such facilities available with LTTE. Also decommissioning of indirect weapon systems to be arranged.	Capability of passing accurate information to bring down accurate indirect fire by the people resettled.	Restrict the area of resettlement as there should not be radio communication from close proximity of HSZs.	Amend SLMM mandate.

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ANNEX B

SECURITY THREAT AFTER CIVILIANS ARE RESETTLED IN HSZS

SRL. NO.	HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS	IDENTIFIED THREATS	RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS	REMARKS
1	Authority to search houses and personnel on suspicion. Also to continue regular checks on entry/ exit points. LTTE will not be allowed to do politics in HSZ.	Military cadres with forge identities will enter HSZs.	Only the people provide their legitimate ownership before 1991/95. LTTE members will not be allowed to resettled.	Nil
2	People resettled will not be allowed to go into prohibited areas.	Ability to attack VPs, VIPs possible	Only in selected areas.
3	Depriving communication facilities and decommissioning of indirect weapons to be done under SLMM supervision.	Accurate indirect fire could be brought down.	-DO-	Relocation of IDPs in crown land elsewhere where required.
4	Declare prohibited areas and legitimate search and arrest within HSZ and also decommissioning of missiles to be done.	Threat on security of air crafts and ships from within HSZ.	-DO-
5	Access to be denied to prohibited areas for civilians.	Ability to identify voids of defences.	-DO-
6	LTTE stop recruiting, total disarming of cadres and hand over weapons to SLMM	Reduce overall operational efficiency by reducing log [logistic] elements in HSZs. Thereby causing reduction of troops in the peninsula.	Resettlement to start after implementation
7	Avoid resettling of civilians in places from where Air port/ Harbour can be threatened and conduct regular checks and searchers and necessary to find hidden weapons etc. declaration of non-execution of underwater / seaborne suicide mission is also needed.	There will be a threat on harbour/air port when civilians resettle close to those locations.	Impose time restrictions on Entry/Exit points. Movement restrictions to be imposed during night. No entry/exit for fishing in HSZs. Resettlement on the coastal belt only in selected areas.	Make necessary arrangements to acquire land to enhance security/ development of harbour /airport
8	Retain buffer zones as much as possible for the defences specially in HSZs.	Armed groups mixed up with civilians may launch attacks where SF will not have sufficient reaction time.	No go areas to be declared separate. Entry/Exit points for different blocks of resettlement and also road networks should be worked out for selected resettlement areas. Such terrorist intentions will totally terminate resettlement.	Additional defence measures to be arranged.
9	Ground of tactical importance should be held by SF and any indication of such threat will be considered very seriously and preventive, deterrent action be taken immediately.	Options open to prepare fortifications in Ground of Tactical importance or selected areas. Eg: Vasavilan, Kadduvan, Thelippala and Keerimalai.	No resettlement in such areas	Maintain military strong points in Grounds of Tactical importance
10	Ownership of houses of displaced personnel who left before 1991/95 will be seriously considered when resettling.	Resettlement of sympathizes with forged identities to assist terrorist in offensive ops [operations] against SF.	Only in selected areas	Psy [psychological] ops and civil affairs operations to take special care of these families
11	Maintain and increase intelligence/survailance and early warning facilities and conduct regular searches of suspicious elements to enhance security of command, fire control and logistic elements	Possible attacks in VHSZs to paralise comd and control system support and log elements thereby prevent efficient conduct and supporting of def ops on FDLs.	Strict security checks on the civilians including house searches as required
12	Reduction of LTTE cadres in areas opposite cleared areas. Weapons withdrawn to be kept under SLMM custody.	SF is forced to contract or vacate certain part of HSZs thereby weakening/reducing the present military superiority in JFN [Jaffna] hence the power projection of LTTE beyond that of SF.	Resettlement will continue parallel to disarming	SLMM mandate to be enhanced and numbers to be increased.
13	To retain necessary amount of depth for the defences at any cost.	If resettled in HSZs as forced the defences to contract, SF will be forced to sacrifice depth of defences.	Resettle in the areas excluding areas which provide the depth.	Can be considered once threat has been reduced/ decommission-ing of weapons had taken place.
14	LTTE to deescalate by disarming and to retain a balance of power parallel to reduction of SF positions.	If the conflict escalates unable to go back to the original positions to regain initiative after civilians have been resettled.	If the threat is eliminated resettlement is possible
15	Reduce LTTE offensive capability by disarming and decommissioning of indirect weapons.	Due to the presence of civilians secrecy of SF defences will be sacrificed thus making defences vulnerable to armed group attacks.	Resettlement programme to be parallel to elimination of threat	-DO-

Source:

De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe’s Letter to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on FM Radio Transmission Facilities for the Use of LTTE Peace Secretariat

In response to a letter by President Chandrika Kumaratunga seeking clarification on the government permitting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to import FM transmission equipment, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sent a letter on January 3, 2003. He wrote the LTTE has not imported VSAT equipment and the consignment was received by Norway, thoroughly checked and moved to Killinochchi under armed guard. Presented below is the full text of letter

3rd January, 2003
Her Excellency Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka,
Presidential Secretariat,
Colombo 1.

Your Excellency,

FM Radio Transmission facilities for the use of the LTTE Peace Secretariat

I write with reference to your letter of December 30, 2002 on the above subject and the attached copy of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway.

I presume you would have had the opportunity to see the Government’s statement on this matter, which was published in the media on the 28th of December, 2002. In case you have not, I am attaching a copy of this document for your information.

Since the Government’s statement contains much of the information regarding the concerns you have expressed in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, I shall only briefly elaborate on issues, which may require further clarification. I note too that we will have the opportunity of discussing this matter fully shortly.

In your enumeration of what you call “the relevant facts regarding this incident”, in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway, you have taken up four specific matters.

1. The import in the consignment of a VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) communication unit, which you say, even the Government of Sri Lanka does not possess.

2. The inclusion of a Radio Data System (RDS) capable of sending data from point to point.

3. The FM frequency range in the equipment imported by the LTTE, which appears to be wider than the frequencies allotted to other FM radio stations operating in Sri Lanka.

4. The consignment of radio broadcasting equipment to the Embassy of the Royal Norwegian Government in Sri Lanka, intended for the use of the LTTE which was received and cleared from the Port of Colombo without payment of customs duty.

Let me briefly recapitulate what has been more comprehensively explained in the Government’s statement.

On October 1, 2002 the Political Headquarters of the LTTE in Kilinochchi informed my Secretary that the LTTE were now engaging in a dissemination campaign about the peace process and that they had purchased a new FM radio transmitter which they would like to bring to the Wanni. They requested that the relevant authorities be informed to give customs clearance for the equipment and that it would be appreciated if they could receive the equipment without delay and on a tax-free basis.

The Government decision on this, in principle, was that FM transmitting facilities should be provided since dissemination of information regarding the peace process, particularly in the North and East was important. As regards the matter of duty free import, the LTTE were to be informed that this concession could not be granted as it was against Government policy to make any exceptions regarding customs duty and VAT.

Thereafter, the LTTE were informed that a formal application with prescribed information, regarding such matters as location of the station, expected area of coverage, the power for transmission, frequencies and other operational details, programme composition etc., should be sent into the Ministry of Mass Communication, so that the application could receive full consideration by the Ministry and the TRCSL, before arriving at a final decision.

In arriving at our decision in principle to consider the LTTE’s request, the following considerations were uppermost in mind:

* That even at present, the LTTE are operating an unauthorised radio transmission facility popularly known as the ‘Voice of the Tigers’ (VOT). This, Your Excellency, as you are well aware, has been in operation for several years and has been totally uncontrolled by any governmental authority;

* The request for a licence, for the first time in the history of the 20-year conflict in which the LTTE has been engaged in with the Government, indicated a welcome change of attitude. It signalled the LTTE’s acceptance and willingness to come within the ambit of Sri Lankan law and regulation. In fact the Government is pleased that through the grant of such a licence to the LTTE Peace Secretariat, radio transmissions by the LTTE are being brought, for the first time, under the laws of Sri Lanka.

The licence that was finally given by the Ministry of Mass Communication on November 11, 2002 in terms of Section 44 of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Act No. 37 of 1966 subjects the holder of the licence, (that is the LTTE Peace Secretariat) to specific conditions regarding the content and manner of their future broadcasting.

The LTTE having a legal radio channel has to be placed in the context of the positive developments towards a permanent peace in Sri Lanka. You, yourself have referred at the commencement of your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway the efforts made during your period of nearly 3 years to enter into direct negotiations with the LTTE.

Finally, and no doubt assisted by the foundation that you laid, it was possible for the Government through the signing of the MoU with the LTTE on 22nd February, 2002 to give practical effect to the commencement of the transformation of the LTTE from being, as you have said “one of the world’s most ruthless and murderous organisations” into a political grouping within the mainstream of the Sri Lankan political system.

I believe this profound paradigm shift, which is now in effect, has been favourably recognised and commented on publicly by the international community as well. Making available community radio broadcasting facilities, under regulation by the Government was seen as one way of encouraging forward movement in this positive direction.

Let me now deal with your concerns.

1. VSAT Communication Unit – Although one unit of VSAT communication equipment of value US Dollars 25,000 was listed in the list of items to be imported by the LTTE, and although the Government statement of 28th December presumed that it had been brought in with the FM radio equipment consignment, I am now informed both by the customs and the LTTE Peace Secretariat, that this unit (for which clearance had been approved by the TRCSL) was NOT shipped from Singapore and has NOT in fact been brought into the country.

Since your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway says that even the Government of Sri Lanka does not have such equipment, let me inform you that the SLT certainly does have VSAT communication facilities. In addition there are apparently 16 other authorised VSAT operators in the country in addition to several unauthorised ones.

Even some foreign correspondents are known to be using VSAT communication units for filing their reports overseas, up-linking to the satellite without going through the SLT international switch. You may recall that as far back as 1996 a facility based data communication system was given to the Ceycom Global Communication Ltd., which has now some 42 VSAT earth terminals in their system.

In this regard you might remember that the National Communication Policy which was approved by the Cabinet on the 13th of November, 2002 refers to the liberalisation of VSAT transmissions in the future in view of the well known fact that information communication technology has been very rapidly evolving across the world.

This will mean that in future any person could import VSAT equipment with the approval of the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (TRC). The up-linking frequency would of course need to be assigned by the TRC.

So in the light of what has been happening here and elsewhere your agitation in regard to VSAT equipment is unclear. Also you will undoubtedly be greatly relieved to know that the VSAT equipment has not been imported.

2. Radio Data System (audio)

The other question you have raised is that of the Radio Data System (RDS). This as Your Excellency may know is an essential part of a FM radio station and all private FM radio stations in Sri Lanka have this equipment. This cannot emit any radio frequency. The value of this equipment was only US Dollars 800.

3. FM frequency range

With reference to the FM frequency range, which you have also found suspicious, the explanation I believe is also quite simple. Different manufacturers evidently have different frequency bands in the FM radio system.

The English may manufacture within a certain frequency band and the US manufacturers in another. What is important is the spot frequency that is allocated by the TRCSL. In this case it is 98 Mhz which no existing operator has been assigned. The Regulatory Authority has the powers to monitor the frequency and the radiated power.

4. The role of the Norwegian Embassy

The major concern that you have referred in your letter to the Prime Minister of Norway is that of the involvement of the Norwegian Embassy in assisting in the importation of the radio transmission equipment.

My observation on this is as follows:

The Government had decided that the acquisition of a FM radio transmission facility would enhance the peace process.

With the intention of assisting in this endeavour, the Government sought to utilise the good offices of the Royal Norwegian government which had done so much to facilitate the peace process to assist in the clearance of the equipment through the Customs. One of the reasons for obtaining the assistance of Norway was that as the facilitator, if the consignment was found to contain anything other than what was intended, that is, radio transmission equipment, the Government was going to disallow import and send the consignment back.

It was in these circumstances that the Norwegian Embassy acted as the consignee with the objective of transmitting the security cleared consignment to the SCOPP (the Peace Secretariat), which would in turn transmit it to the LTTE Peace Secretariat.

However even before this clearance was done, the Government took the step of ensuring that the items would be subject to the strictest check. A 4-member expert team consisting of senior officials of the Rupavahini Corporation, Sri Lanka Air Force, Sri Lanka Army and the Ministry of Mass Communications thereupon went to the Customs warehouse and after opening the packages examined all the equipment.

They confirmed that the equipment was such that was needed for FM radio transmissions and also made some technical observations. These have been conveyed to the LTTE Peace Secretariat for compliance. It was this team, which confirmed that the VSAT equipment was not among the list of items which were imported.

You will appreciate that the FM radio transmission equipment after checking was sealed and finally sent to the LTTE Peace Secretariat under armed guard.

This was done to prevent any other material being introduced into the packages or any items being removed.

The question that awaits settlement is that of the duty payable since, after import by the Embassy the goods were passed on to SCOPP, in the first instance and SCOPP is an agency of the Government.

The Minister of Finance will determine in the next few days the manner in which the issue of duty payable will be resolved. While endorsing your assertion that the Norwegian Government and its Embassy here have been always fully supportive of our efforts to consolidate the peace process, I must urge a note of caution in your intended intervention with the Prime Minister of Norway.

The Norwegian peace support team of Deputy Minister Vidar Helgessen, Mr. Eric Solheim and H.E. Jon Westborg have, as you know, been extremely active in facilitating the peace process. H.E. Jon Westborg, the Norwegian Ambassador has been in service here for almost six years and has an unrivalled experience of the ground realities in Sri Lanka.

It is known that the credentials of his successor have been handed over to the Foreign Ministry in mid-November and that on completion of his assignment in Colombo he will be shortly returning to Norway.

Undoubtedly the Government of Norway will continue to utilise his expertise. I think therefore that as a Government we should exercise due care, at this critical stage in the peace process, to ensure that the enthusiasm of the Norwegian facilitation and the momentum thus far generated continues undiminished. I trust the above clarifies some of the concerns you have raised.

I look forward to our further discussion at an early meeting. Since you have released copies of your letters to the media, I am doing so myself since the public need to be kept fully informed.

Yours sincerely,

Ranil Wickremesinghe,
Prime Minister.

Vaddukoddai Resolution

The Resolution was adopted at the first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on 14 May 1976. TULF’s participation in the 1977 general elections was anchored in this Resolution. In this Resolution, the TULF declared its intent of forming a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam. S. J. V. Chelavanayakam presided over the Convention. The following is a translation of the Resolution, which was originally adopted in Tamil.

Whereas, throughout the centuries from the dawn of history, the Sinhalese and Tamil nations have divided between themselves the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country in its Southern and Western parts from the river Walawe to that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the Northern and Eastern districts; And,

Whereas, the Tamil kingdom was overthrown in war and conquered by the Portuguese in 1619, and from them by the Dutch and the British in turn, independent of the Sinhalese Kingdoms; And,

Whereas, the British colonists, who ruled the territories of the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms separately, joined under compulsion the territories of the Sinhalese and the Tamil Kingdoms for purposes of administrative convenience on the recommendation of the Colebrooke Commission in 1833; And,

Whereas, the Tamil leaders were in the forefront of the freedom movement to rid Ceylon of colonial bondage which ultimately led to the grant of independence to Ceylon in 1948; And,

Whereas, the foregoing facts of history were completely overlooked, and power over the entire country was transferred to the Sinhalese nation on the basis of a numerical majority, thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of subject people; And,

Whereas, successive Sinhalese governments since independence have always encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism of the Sinhalese people and have used their political power to the detriment of the Tamils by:

(a) Depriving one half of the Tamil people of their citizenship and franchise rights thereby reducing Tamil representation in Parliament,

(b) Making serious inroads into the territories of the former Tamil Kingdom by a system of planned and state-aided Sinhalese colonization and large scale regularization of recently encouraged Sinhalese encroachments, calculated to make the Tamils a minority in their own homeland,

(c) Making Sinhala the only official language throughout Ceylon thereby placing the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and the Tamil language,

(d) Giving the foremost place to Buddhism under the Republican Constitution thereby reducing the Hindus, Christians, and Muslims to second class status in this country,

(e) Denying to the Tamils equality of opportunity in the spheres of employment, education, land alienation and economic life in general and starving Tamil areas of large scale industries and development schemes thereby seriously endangering their very existence in Ceylon,

(f) Systematically cutting them off from the main-stream of Tamil cultures in South India while denying them opportunities of developing their language and culture in Ceylon, thereby working inexorably towards the cultural genocide of the Tamils,

(g) Permitting and unleashing communal violence and intimidation against the Tamil speaking people as happened in Amparai and Colombo in 1956; all over the country in 1958; army reign of terror in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1961; police violence at the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974 resulting in the death of nine persons in Jaffna; police and communal violence against Tamil speaking Muslims at Puttalam and various other parts of Ceylon in 1976 ––all these calculated to instill terror in the minds of the Tamil speaking people, thereby breaking their spirit and the will to resist injustices heaped on them,

(h) By terrorizing, torturing, and imprisoning Tamil youths without trial for long periods on the flimsiest grounds,

1. Capping it all by imposing on the Tamil nation a Constitution drafted, under conditions of emergency without opportunities for free discussion, by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the Soulbury Constitution distorted by the citizenship laws resulting in weightage in representation to the Sinhalese majority, thereby depriving the Tamils of even the remnants of safeguards they had under the earlier constitution; And,

Whereas, all attempts by the various Tamil political parties to win their rights, by co-operating with the governments, by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary agitations, by entering into pacts and understandings with successive Prime Ministers, in order to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with the self-respect of the Tamil people have proved to be futile; And,

Whereas, the efforts of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress to ensure non-domination of the minorities by the majority by the adoption of a scheme of balanced representation in a Unitary Constitution have failed and even the meager safeguards provided in article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution against discriminatory legislation have been removed by the Republican Constitution; And,

Whereas, the proposals submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi for maintaining the unity of the country while preserving the integrity of the Tamil people by the establishment of an autonomous Tamil State within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon were summarily and totally rejected without even the courtesy of a consideration of its merits; And,

Whereas, the amendments to the basic resolutions, intended to ensure the minimum of safeguards to the Tamil people moved on the basis of the nine point demands formulated at the conference of all Tamil Political parties at Valvettithurai on 7th February 1971 and by individual parties and Tamil members of Parliament including those now in the government party, were rejected in toto by the government and Constituent Assembly; And,

Whereas, even amendments to the draft proposals relating to language, religion, and fundamental-rights including one calculated to ensure that at least the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1956 be included in the Constitution, were defeated, resulting in the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by a large majority of the Tamil members of Parliament; And,

Whereas, the Tamil United Liberation Front, after rejecting the Republican Constitution adopted on the 22nd of May, 1972, presented a six point demand to the Prime Minister and the Government on 25th June, 1972, and gave three months time within which the Government was called upon to take meaningful steps to amend the Constitution so as to meet the aspirations of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the six points, and informed the Government that if it failed to do so the Tamil United Liberation Front would launch a non-violent direct action against the Government in order to win the freedom and the rights of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the right of self-determination; And,

Whereas, this last attempt by the Tamil United Liberation Front to win Constitutional recognition of the rights of the Tamil Nation without jeopardizing the unity of the country was callously ignored by the Prime Minister and the Government; And,

Whereas, the opportunity provided by the Tamil United Liberation Front leader to vindicate the Government’s contention that their constitution had the backing of the Tamil people, by resigning from his membership of the National State Assembly and creating a by-election was deliberately put off for over two years in utter disregard of the democratic right of the Tamil voters of Kankesanthurai, And,

Whereas, in the by-election held on the 6^th February 1975, the voters of Kankesanthurai by a preponderant majority not only rejected the Republican Constitution imposed on them by the Sinhalese Government, but also gave a mandate to Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. and through him to the Tamil United Liberation Front for the restoration and reconstitution of the Free Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam.

The first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front meeting at Pannakam (Vaddukoddai Constituency) on the 14th day of May, 1976, hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from Sinhalese and this Convention announces to the world that the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese ,who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.

And, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment to the setting up of a separated state of Tamil Eelam expressed by the Ceylon Workers Congress as a Trade Union of the Plantation Workers, the majority of whom live and work outside the Northern and Eastern areas,

This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam, based on the right of self determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country.

This Convention further declares:

• That the State of Tamil Eelam shall consist of the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of the State of Tamil Eelam to all Tamil speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of Tamil Eelam.

• That the constitution of Tamil Eelam shall be based on the principle of democratic decentralization so as to ensure the non-domination of any religious or territorial community of Tamil Eelam by any other section.

• That in the state of Tamil Eelam caste shall be abolished and the observance of the pernicious practice of untouchability or inequality of any type based on birth shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any form punished by law.

• That Tamil Eelam shall be a secular state giving equal protection and assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may belong.

• That Tamil shall be the language of the State, but the rights of Sinhalese speaking minorities in Tamil Eelam to education and transaction of business in their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamil speaking minorities in the Sinhala State.

• That Tamil Eelam shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labor shall be recognized, the means of production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while permitting private enterprise in these branches within limit prescribed by law, economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall be a ceiling on the total wealth that any individual of family may acquire.

This Convention directs the Action Committee of the Tamil United Liberation Front to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation;

And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is reached.

Source:

Vaddukoddai Resolution

SLMC Proposals for North East Interim Council

Late SLMC leader and Ports Minister M.H.M. Ashraff, before his death in an aircrash on September 16, had proposed the following items to enable the security and safeguards of the minorities in the the North East when the Interim Regional Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces are established under the proposed New Constitution. These proposals assume importance in view of the Presidential assertion to introduce the Constitutional Reforms Bill after the parliamentary elections.

Powers

The Interim Council shall exercise its powers with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for equality of civil, political social, religious and cultural rights of freedom from discrimination for all citizens and to parity of esteem and just and equal treatment for their identity, ethos and aspirations of all communities.

Membership

I. Members of the Interim Council shall be appointed by the President upon being nominated by registered political parties or independent groups representing the citizens of the Northern and Eastern regions. However, the President shall ensure that the ethnic composition of the Northern and Eastern Regions is reflected in the membership of the Interim Council.

II. The governor shall also appoint another minister from the largest minority community on the advice of the Chief Minister.

III. A member nominated by a political party shall be liable to be removed at the instance of that party or independent group.

IV. The President shall fill the vacancy created by the removal with another nominee from the same political party or independent group.

Board of Ministers

I. The Board of Ministers shall consist of the Chief Minister, two Deputy Chief Ministers and six other ministers. The Governor shall appoint as Chief Minister the member of the council who is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of this council.

II. The Governor shall appoint the two Deputy Chief Ministers and they shall be from communities other than the community to which the chief minister belongs. The deputy chief ministers shall be the persons who are best able to command the support of the majority of the members of their respective communities.

Executive Committee System

The provisions of Chapter XV relating to executive committee will apply to the interim council.

Constitutional assignment of ministerial subjects and functions

The core subjects and functions to be assigned to the chief minister, the two deputy chief ministers and the other ministers should be enshrined in the new constitution.

Parallel Consent

The following decisions of the council shall require parallel consent i.e. a majority of those members present and voting and including a majority among each of the communities represented in the interim council i.e. Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities.

a. Election of the Speaker

b. adoption of standing orders

c. Any other vital decisions pertaining to the security, religion, etc. of the communities of the region that shall be declared by the Speaker as a decision requiring parallel consent upon a motion to that effect being supported by not less than 30 per centum of the total number of members.

Representation at the chief ministers Conference

The two deputy chief ministers shall be entitled to participate in the chief ministers conference.

Budget Allocations

The Finance Commission shall take into consideration the following matters before allocating funds and give appropriate directives to the Interim Council.

I. The disparity already prevailing in certain under developed local authority areas.

II. The size of the population and geographic size of the area of the local authority.

III. The Interim Council should expend such funds as are allocated to it by the central government in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Finance Commission.

IV. The Interim Council should also ensure areas where minority communities are concentrated within a particular local authority should not in any way be discriminated in the allocation of funds for development.

Law and Order

I. The Interim Council shall assist the government in the de-escalation of and de-commissioning of illegally held arms in the possessions of para military groups.

II. The chief minister shall take all decisions pertaining to the security of the minorities of the region in consultation with the respective Deputy Chief Ministers.

New Administrative Districts

There shall be established a new Administrative District for the coastal area of Digamadulla district consisting of Kalmunai, Samanthurai and Pottuvil areas.

Source:

SLMC Proposals for North East Interim Council

Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities 5 January 1995

தமிழில்

A seven point document was formulated during the second round of talks which took place on 2 January 1995. The Sri Lanka government delegation included a senior Sri Lanka Army Officer, Brigadier A.S.Pieris and a Sri Lanka naval officer, Captain Prasanna Rajaratne. The LTTE delegation was led by Mr. Tamilselvan, Head of the Political Wing. The Declaration of the cessation of hostilities was signed on 5 January 1995, simultaneously by Mr.Velupillai Pirabakaran, Leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in Jaffna, and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief, in Colombo – and the document was exchanged between them through the good offices of the International Red Cross Committee. The Cessation of Hostilities came into effect from 8 January 1995.

Text of Declaration

The modalities for the implementation of the agreed Cessation of Hostilities by the Government and LTTE for a specified period will be as follows:-

1. There will be no offensive operations by either party during this period. An offensive operation will be considered a violation of the agreement.

2. The Security Forces and the LTTE will maintain their present positions on the ground, keeping a minimum of 600 metres between each other. However, each party would reserve the right of movement within 100 metres from their own bunker lines, keeping a minimum of 400 metres in between. Any party moving in the restricted areas would be considered an offensive operation.

3. The Navy and Airforce will continue to perform their legitimate tasks for safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, from external aggression, without in any way engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE, or causing any obstructions to legitimate and bona fide fishing activity in specified areas.

4. Acts such as sabotage, bomb explosions, abductions, assassinations and intimidation directed at any political group, party or any individual will amount to an offensive operation.

5.a. It is suggested that Committees to deal with violations of this agreement be set up to inquire into nay instances of violation of the above terms of agreement. These Committees could be set up in the areas of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa-Ampara and any other areas as deemed necessary

b. It will be the responsibility of these Committees to take immediate action on complaints made by either party to this agreement to inquire into and resolve such disputes.

c. These Committees could comprise representatives drawn from Canada, Netherlands, Norway, ICRC and from retired Judges or Public Officers, Religious Heads and other leading citizens: all appointed by mutual agreement.

d. Each Committee could consist of five members, viz: 02 from Government, 02 from LTTE and, 01 from a Foreign Country who will be Chairman.

e. Freedom of movement for the Committees to perform their tasks will have to be ensured by both parties to the agreement.

f. Facilities required for the Committees to act swiftly and impartially will have to provided by mutual agreement.

6. Recommend establishment of communication between Sri Lanka and LTTE military area leaders which will enable them to sort out problems expeditiously, locally.

7. Cessation of hostilities will continue till notice of termination is given by either party. Such notice should be given at least 72 hours before termination.

Signed on 5 January 1995

V.Pirabakaran,
Leader, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Chandrika

Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

 

Source:

Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities 5 January 1995